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Every intellectual property (“IP”) right has its own definition of infringement.
In this Article, we suggest that this diversity of legal rules is largely traceable to
differences in the audience in IP cases. Patent, trademark, copyright, and de-
sign patent each focus on a different person as the fulcrum for evaluating IP
infringement. That patent law, for example, focuses on an expert audience
while trademark looks to a consumer audience explains many of the differ-
ences in how patent and trademark cases are decided. Expert audiences are
likely to evaluate infringement based on the technical similarity between the
plaintiff’s and defendant’s works. Consumers, by contrast, are likely to pay
more attention to market substitution and less attention to how things work
under the hood. Understanding the different audiences in IP infringement is
critical to understanding how the IP regimes variously define infringement.
The focus on audience has normative as well as descriptive implications.
Neither patent law, with its focus on experts and technical similarity, nor
trademark law, with its market-based consumer focus, has it entirely correct.
Rather, we suggest that as a general matter, infringement of an IP right
should require both technical similarity and market substitution. An ideal IP
regime should care about a defendant’s conduct only if that conduct actually
causes injury to the plaintiff’s market and its work is sufficiently like the
plaintiff’s that it is reasonable to give the plaintiff control over that work.
Assessing infringement through the expert’s eyes ensures that the law prevents
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closely related works in the field while permitting sufficiently different contri-
butions. The consumer vantage point ensures that we protect IP owners only
when they have been harmed in the marketplace.
IP owners who want to show infringement should have to demonstrate both
that the defendant’s work is technically similar to their own from the expert’s
vantage point and that the defendant’s use causes the plaintiff harm in the
marketplace. Copyright law, which looks to both experts and consumers at
various points in the infringement analysis, is on the right track.
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Introduction
At the heart of any IP case is the problem of deciding whether the de-
fendant has infringed on the plaintiff’s right. A principal question in IP in-
fringement disputes is whether the defendant’s product (or work, or brand,
or idea) is too similar in some respect to the plaintiff’s.
But who decides whether the defendant’s product is too similar to the
plaintiff’s? Put another way, who is the audience in IP infringement? Is it the
customer of the parties’ products that must find the products too similar?
Or perhaps an expert on the products’ subject matter? Or instead an ordi-
nary reasonable person? This choice can easily affect the judgment on simi-
larity. For example, a chemist might think that two drugs for providing pain
relief are not sufficiently similar because of their different chemical composi-
tion or because they trigger a different pathway in the human body. A cus-
tomer, by contrast, might find the two drugs highly similar because they
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provide comparable relief without side effects. An ordinary reasonable per-
son might find insufficient similarity between two audiovisual works that
are both aimed at children and depict fantasylands filled with fanciful crea-
tures because a principal character in one work wears a “cummerbund,”
while a major character in the other wears a “diplomat’s sash.” By contrast,
the typical child encountering the works would regard them as substantially
similar.1 A musicologist might ignore differences in musical style, instead
focusing on the underlying composition, in determining whether a pop song
is similar to a calypso song. A consumer would do just the opposite.2 Con-
sumers may focus on descriptive similarities in brand names or functional
aspects of packaging that producers do not intend to indicate the product’s
source.3
As these examples illustrate, the choice of audience to decide similarity
matters because it affects whether infringement is found, which in turn
influences the sorts of works that third parties are willing to produce
without risking liability. Choice of audience thus collectively shapes the
available body of works, products, and brands. This critical link between
the audience for IP infringement and the types of works the law permits
underscores the importance of the optimal choice of audience.4 But sur-
prisingly, the question of the audience for IP infringement has largely
1. Cf. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1166–67 (9th Cir. 1977) (“We do not believe that the ordinary reasonable person, let alone a
child, viewing these works will even notice that Pufnstuf is wearing a cummerbund while
Mayor McCheese is wearing a diplomat’s sash.”).
2. See Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music Composi-
tion Copyright Infringement, 11 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 137, 140 (2011).
3. See Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trade-
mark Distinctiveness, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 1033, 1099 (2009) (“If a descriptive word mark is
presented in a spatial placement, size, and style that matches the consumer’s schematic mental
model of what a product package and brand look like, the word may be perceived as a source
indicator even if its semantic meaning is ‘merely descriptive.’ ”); cf. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–35 (2001) (holding that a dual-spring design mechanism
for keeping outdoor signs upright in adverse wind conditions serves a utilitarian function and,
as a result, is not protectable under trademark law).
4. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 Va. L.
Rev. 1745 (2012) (discussing how instrumental justifications of granting authors and inven-
tors incentives to create, respectively, expressive works and inventions, sit at the base of copy-
right and patent laws); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L.
Rev. 137, 142 (2010) (“Trademark law prevents parties from using a mark that is likely to
confuse consumers about the source of their goods. In the context of competing goods, this
protects mark owners from diverted trade and consumers from making mistaken purchases.”).
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been ignored in the academic literature5 and undertheorized in judicial
decisions.6
Curiously, each IP regime offers a different answer to the audience ques-
tion. Patent law generally seeks the opinion of a hypothetical expert, the
person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”). Trademark law takes
the opposite approach, principally asking what consumers in the real world
think. Copyright law seems to employ aspects of each approach, switching
off between seeking the perspective of experts, consumers, and ordinary ob-
servers. And design patent law traditionally applied a hybrid approach but
has recently switched to a consumer-focused inquiry.7
As we explain in this Article, the current hodgepodge of audiences in IP
infringement cases reflects a lack of deliberation over what ought to be de-
fined as infringement. Each regime’s choice of audience drives its definition
of infringement, which in turn determines how well the IP regime achieves
its goals. Take patent law’s focus on experts. Experts are likely to find in-
fringement when two items are technically similar, whether or not consum-
ers would view them as market substitutes. As a result, patent law tends to
find infringement whenever two products are sufficiently similar technically,
without regard to the market relationship between the products. Trademark
and design patent law, by contrast, focus on the consumer audience. Con-
sumers are likely to find similarity when two works are market substitutes;
they don’t usually care what is under the hood. So trademark and design
patent law tend to find infringement when two products satisfy the same
market need or desire, whether or not that market substitution results from
5. There are a few articles that focus on a particular audience in a single area of law. See,
e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of
PHOSITA, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 885 (2004) (examining the patentability standard of non-
obviousness); Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 Minn. L. Rev.
72, 89–120 (2012); Jamie Lund, Fixing Music Copyright (Mar. 11, 2013) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231836 (arguing that a trained musician is the
appropriate audience for music composition copyright). But no one to our knowledge has
written about the issue across IP regimes or even as a comprehensive issue of infringement in
any of the IP regimes.
6. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162–65 (establishing the Ninth Circuit’s
general two-part framework for evaluating substantial similarity in copyright infringement
cases and referencing without further analysis that “expert testimony” would be appropriate to
compare “specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed” and that the “ordinary reasonable
person” is the audience for evaluating “whether there is substantial similarity in expressions”).
The issue of audience comes up at least implicitly in other legal areas, like tort liability for
product design defects. In that context, there has been debate over whether to measure liability
based on consumer expectations or risk utility. Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook.
L. Rev. 1061 (2009).
7. There is a fourth possible approach—the reasonable competitor—that seems most
commonly used in trade secret law, although Mark Janis and Timothy Holbrook suggest that it
is relevant to some aspects of patent law as well. Janis & Holbrook, supra note 5, at 101–07. In
the interest of space, we do not discuss trade secrets or the reasonable competitor further in
this Article.
May 2014] The Audience in IP Infringement 1255
the technical similarity of the protected product’s novel attributes. Copy-
right law takes a hybrid approach, asking some questions from the perspec-
tive of an expert and others from the perspective of either a consumer or a
reasonable “ordinary observer.” As a result, copyright sometimes seems to
pay attention to technical similarity and other times to focus on market
substitution.
The first goal of our Article is descriptive. We think that a focus on the
audience in IP infringement—and a recognition that each IP regime has a
different audience in mind—helps explain why four legal regimes with re-
lated goals8 have nonetheless chosen such different means of testing
infringement.
But our focus on the audience has a normative payoff as well: it causes
us to ask in a more general way what IP laws should define as infringement.
We think copyright’s hybrid model hints at the right approach. In this Arti-
cle, we argue that each of the IP regimes—patent, copyright, trademark, and
design patent—should find infringement only when the defendant’s product
is too similar to the plaintiff’s in the eyes of both experts and consumers, not
just one or the other. Put another way, infringement in an ideal IP regime
grounded in utilitarianism should require proof of both sufficient technical
similarity and market substitution. Market substitution is important because
a use that does not interfere with the plaintiff’s market in some way gener-
ally does no relevant harm.9 Technical similarity is also important because
not all acts that interfere with a plaintiff’s market are problematic. A defen-
dant who enters the market with a different, better product, for instance,
may erode the market for the plaintiff’s product, but the law should not
prohibit that competition.
An IP regime’s choice of audience is bound up with that regime’s em-
phasis on technical similarity, market substitution, or both. The expert-as-
audience approach ensures that we find infringement only when two works
are sufficiently similar in their protectable elements. An audience of experts
familiar with the subject matter is likely to understand the technical and
historical constraints—including those of the particular genre—that led to
similarities and to find improper appropriation only when the works bear
sufficient technical similarity to each other despite those constraints.10 As-
sessing infringement through the expert’s eyes thus ensures that the law pro-
tects creators only from sufficiently close imitations.
8. That said, there are differences in these legal regimes’ goals, which we explore infra in
Part I. And as we explain infra in Part III, despite these differences, we think the basic audience
for infringement ought to be the same for the four regimes.
9. The definition of the market is complex. See infra text accompanying notes 221–226.
10. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 989, 991–92 (1997) (discussing the line between “improvement” and “imita-
tion”). For an exploration of whether copyright law ought to seek to promote aesthetic pro-
gress, see Barton Beebe, Bleistein; or, Copyright Law, and the Problem of Aesthetic Progress
(Oct. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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The consumer matters too, because sometimes similarity of expression
occurs in such disparate contexts that the two works are not market substi-
tutes at all. Consumers are more likely than domain experts to be sensitive
to whether the defendant’s work is substituting for the plaintiff’s in the mar-
ketplace. This consumer vantage point matters because IP laws—with their
instrumental incentives—are generally concerned with protecting IP owners
only when they have been harmed in the marketplace with regard to their
underlying intellectual property.11
Many of the problems with modern IP law can be traced to finding
infringement when only one form of similarity—expert based or consumer
based—is present. Our framework has the potential to reconceive the idea of
IP infringement in a way that solves a number of the problems with each
regime. For instance, importing market-substitution considerations into
patent law can help avoid findings of minor infringements that have major
consequences. At the same time, relying on experts to assess trademarks can
prevent trademark-owner overreaching and the problem of “drift” in con-
sumer perceptions.12
In Part I, we describe the different ways trademark, patent, copyright,
and design patent law define the relevant audience. In Part II, we elaborate
on and analyze the possible types of infringement audiences in IP law: the
consumer, the expert, and the ordinary reasonable person. We also touch on
how the audience choice has second-order effects: the choice is intimately
bound up with the question of who the fact finder should be. In Part III, we
show how the choice of audience relates to the goals of IP law. We argue that
IP infringement should require similarity from both the expert’s and the
consumer’s point of view. Employing this framework, we evaluate the suc-
cess of trademark, patent, copyright, and design patent laws in matching
goal to audience. We conclude with a few thoughts on how our hybrid ap-
proach may be implemented in practice.
I. Audiences in IP Cases
The major forms of IP—trademark, patent, copyright, and design pat-
ent—look different, but they do have at least one objective in common: they
are generally concerned with the instrumental goal of providing individuals
with an incentive to create something intangible that might otherwise be
easily appropriated.13
11. Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 Geo. L.J. 2133, 2149 (2012).
12. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1669, 1694–95 (2007).
13. See generally Lemley, supra note 10. Trademark law seems like the exception here
because it is traditionally concerned with encouraging a working marketplace by allowing
consumers and producers to accurately identify goods or services and protect brand reputa-
tions. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 269–70 (1987); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trade-
mark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839 (2007) (making the case that trademark law tradi-
tionally was not concerned with protecting consumers but rather with protecting producers
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Because IP laws protect intangible concepts, communicating what the IP
right covers is more difficult than articulating the scope of property rights
for tangible items, whose bounds are easier to describe and depict.14 Moreo-
ver, because IP laws protect things that are typically new and relatively un-
known, the vocabulary available to communicate what these items are is
often inadequate.15 Complicating the definition of the IP right is the fact that
some forms of IP law, such as copyright, do not require that the creator even
attempt to articulate the bounds or characteristics of her creation; legal dis-
putes in these cases involve holistically comparing the plaintiff’s and defen-
dant’s creations.16 The difficulty (and sometimes, the lack of necessity) of
communicating precisely what is protected complicates the resolution of a
claim for IP infringement because such a claim must always involve a deter-
mination of whether the allegedly infringing item is equivalent or too simi-
lar to the plaintiff’s protected item.
Yet there is another underexplored layer of complexity in determining
IP infringement. If we are to base infringement on similarity—and all IP
regimes do—we must refer to some audience to determine whether the pro-
tected and allegedly infringing items are too similar. In other words, even if
we know what we are comparing the defendant’s product to, in order to
determine infringement we must also know who serves as the reference
point for that comparison.
In this Part, we consider trademark, patent, copyright, and design pat-
ent law in turn, paying particular attention to the audience each form uses
to assess similarity for infringement. We find that trademark law focuses
primarily on the consumer as the audience for IP infringement. By contrast,
patent law focuses primarily on a different audience: the expert. Both design
patent and copyright law are more mixed. At various points, each focuses on
the consumer, the expert, and the ordinary reasonable observer.
A. Trademark Law
Trademark law protects brands, which are manifested in words, sym-
bols, logos, and sometimes a product’s design or packaging.17 Brands are
from unfair competition). Nonetheless, trademark law seeks to accomplish this goal by en-
couraging the creation of strong—intangible—marks associated with goods or services and
protecting them from appropriation. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trade-
mark Law, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1885 (2011). So while the goals are different, the structure
of the right is similar in many ways to that of patents and copyrights.
14. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743, 1744–45 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual
Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719, 726 (2009); see also Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent
Claim Construction, 38 Rutgers L.J. 61, 65–66 (2006) (describing the linguistic challenge of
concisely describing complex patent claims).
15. Fromer, supra note 14, at 726; Osenga, supra note 14, at 66–67.
16. Fromer, supra note 14, at 743–47.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining trademarks to include certain “word[s], name[s],
symbol[s], or device[s], or any combination thereof”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
529 U.S. 205, 209–16 (2000) (holding that product design or packaging might constitute a
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protectable under federal law so long as they are “used by a person” in com-
merce in a distinctive way “to identify and distinguish his or her goods[ or
services] . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”18 Protection lasts as
long as the trademark continues to be used in commerce and has not been
abandoned.19
Trademark law focuses on fair competition.20 Trademark theory suggests
that trademarks bolster trade by “identify[ing] a product as satisfactory and
thereby . . . stimulat[ing] further purchases by the consuming public.”21 Ac-
cording to this theory, producers of trademarked goods will have the incen-
tive to invest in the goods’ quality because consumers will use the trademark
as a way to identify a desirable good only if their past experiences reliably
forecast the good’s worth.22 Protecting against trademark infringement,
from this vantage point, thus prevents others from trading on the goodwill
that the trademark represents and helps consumers be certain that they can
easily find the products they seek.23 In all of these ways, trademarks reduce
consumers’ search costs—the expenditures they must make to discern im-
portant qualities of goods or services—which are frequently hard to
measure.24
Trademarks, then, ought to promote trade and enable consumer deci-
sionmaking. To achieve this goal, trademark law guards against using a too-
similar mark that causes consumer confusion about the origins of goods or
services.25
In light of trademark’s general focus on consumers in the marketplace,26
it is not surprising that the law focuses on consumers—typically real rather
protectable trademark). See generally Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 Fla. L.
Rev. 981 (2012) (discussing brands as a unifying principle for the modern Lanham Act).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Likewise, under a more recent addition to the law, they are protect-
able if a person has a “bona fide intention to use [them] in commerce and applies to register
[them] on the principal register established by [federal law].” Id.
19. Id. §§ 1058–1059.
20. McKenna, supra note 13.
21. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813,
818 (1927).
22. Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 269–70.
23. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trade-
mark Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 547, 549 (2006); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777, 786–88 (2004).
24. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623
(2004); Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 Trademark Rep. 523,
525–27 (1988). But see Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark
Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 67 (2012).
25. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trade-
mark Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 611, 614 (1999).
26. Courts and trademark owners have increasingly sought to ground trademarks not in
consumer protection but in a theory of trademarks as property. For criticism of this trend, see
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687
(1999), and Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4.
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than hypothetical consumers—as its audience for infringement. There is a
real customer base for branded products, and because the goal of trade-
marks is to protect customers from fraud, it is intuitive to focus on how
those consumers will actually react. The basic test for trademark infringe-
ment is a multifactor test measuring the likelihood of confusion between the
goods at issue. It asks whether real consumers are actually confused and also
looks to other factors, like similarity of the marks, proximity of the goods,
and the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark.27 Some of these factors, like
evidence of actual confusion, rely on what the consumer thinks directly.
Other factors, such as proximity of the goods or similarity of the marks,
appear to demand the vantage point of the consumer, but courts sometimes
rely on experts to tell us what consumers think.28 Yet other factors, notably
intent, focus on the defendant’s behavior rather than on the consumer’s
reaction. Nonetheless, overall, the consumer vantage point is the touchstone
of trademark infringement analysis.29
Likelihood of confusion is a question of fact that is generally presented
to the jury.30 Trademark cases sometimes feature consumer surveys and evi-
dence of actual consumer confusion, thereby allowing the jury to obtain
evidence of how actual consumers in the market have reacted to the defen-
dant’s brand in relation to the plaintiff’s.31 In many cases, however, the jury
itself might stand in for the consumer.32 Jurors may have experience with the
27. According to a leading case, the major relevant factors are “1. strength of the mark; 2.
proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. market-
ing channels used; 6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the pur-
chaser; 7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the
product lines.” AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).
28. Compare Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2008) (crediting
expert testimony to assess whether consumers of enterprise modeling and architecture
software would find the parties’ products to be similar), and Rolex Watch USA, Inc., v. Meece,
158 F.3d 816, 830–31 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that expert testimony on the context in which
consumers would evaluate watch marks was relevant to the likelihood of confusion), with
Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 659, 662–63 (10th Cir. 1987) (consider-
ing as relevant advertising and designer experts’ viewpoint on both the similarity of the visual
impact of “Rainbow Snow” mark for snow cone business to “Rainbo” mark for oil company
and the distinctiveness of the “Rainbo” mark).
29. E.g., Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks, Inc. v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir.
2011); Hensley Mfg., Inc. v. Propride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2009). Barton Beebe
has shown that in practice, proximity of goods, similarity of marks, and defendant’s intent
were the driving factors in trademark infringement decisions; indeed, these factors were far
more important than survey evidence of actual consumers. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical
Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581 (2006).
30. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 584 (2d Cir. 1990).
31. See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
tion § 23:17 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing survey evidence). But cf. Beebe, supra note 29, at
1640–42 (showing that parties presented survey evidence in only 20 percent of a sample of
decided cases, contrary to conventional wisdom).
32. See, e.g., Michael Grynberg, The Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. Rev.
1283, 1283–84 (2011) (“To measure ‘likelihood of confusion,’ fact finders must put themselves
in the shoes of relevant consumers while accommodating the effect of their own
conceptions.”).
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brands in question or at least may have encountered sufficiently similar is-
sues while shopping to allow them to make a realistic assessment of whether
they would be confused. And while they are not instructed to do so, it may
be inevitable that a juror with her own view from experience about whether
two brands are confusingly similar will be influenced by that view.33
It is important to recognize, however, that there are systematic ways in
which the jury’s perspective is likely to diverge from that of actual consum-
ers. Actual consumers may vary in the time they devote to making a
purchasing decision depending on the nature of the product. Jurors, by con-
trast, will focus sustained attention on differences between the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s brands over the course of a trial, and they may accordingly be
more likely to pick up on differences between those brands than would a
consumer, who may give the product only a casual look on a crowded store
shelf. Thus, to follow the prescribed test of looking to the views of actual
consumers in the marketplace, jurors need to channel the real consumer
audience by disregarding their own considered views in favor of an assess-
ment of what their (or another’s) first instinct would have been.
Furthermore, while many trademark cases involve products sold to the
general consuming public, others involve specialized audiences, such as
computer makers who buy semiconductor chips.34 In the latter cases, likeli-
hood of confusion among those consumers depends critically on jurors ap-
plying the perspective of the actual purchasers of the goods at issue
(computer makers, in this example) rather than their own.35 Trademark law
accounts for this situation by looking to actual consumers’ confusion and
including “consumer sophistication” as a factor in the analysis.36 To do their
job right, the jurors in such a case would need to ascertain what these con-
sumers think, not what they themselves think.
Yet the divergence between juror and consumer is more systematic than
simply adopting the mindset of different purchasers. Trademark law holds
that a brand infringes even if the overwhelming majority of consumers
aren’t confused; indeed, a mark can be infringing if only 10 percent are
confused.37 Thus, even jurors who have personal experience with a product
33. Studies show that jurors often rely on their life experiences to help them evaluate
information presented at trial and, more generally, to make their decisions. See, e.g., Nancy J.
King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury
Decisions, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 63, 78 (1993); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Reasoning in
Explanation-Based Decision Making, 49 Cognition 123, 126 (1993); Marla Sandys et al., Tak-
ing Account of the “Diminished Capacities of the Retarded”: Are Capital Jurors Up to the Task?,
57 DePaul L. Rev. 679, 694–95 (2008).
34. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(presenting the issue of whether “386” was a generic term for semiconductor chip
architecture).
35. See id. at 1293–95.
36. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. See Henri’s Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 1983); cf.
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(“[T]he crucial issue . . . is whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of
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or brand must disregard that knowledge to an extent and instead put them-
selves in the mindset of the least sophisticated subset of consumers.
In sum, trademark law primarily chooses the consumer as its audience
in ascertaining infringement, but the consumer’s perspective is filtered
through rules that can skew that perspective.
More recent developments in trademark law have threatened to move
the law’s focus away from consumers and toward brand owners themselves.
The doctrine of dilution—providing owners of famous marks with protec-
tion against others’ use of their mark, even if consumers are not con-
fused38—and the idea that there is a right to control merchandising of
products labeled with a brand39 both focus less on consumer perception and
more on the idea that the brand is a form of property over which the trade-
mark owner ought to have plenary control.40 The move away from an ex-
plicit focus on confusion is controversial, and many have criticized dilution
and merchandising for doing just that.41 But even these more producer-ori-
ented theories of trademark law require some means for assessing infringe-
ment. “Coke” may be a famous mark with strong rights to prevent dilution
even in the absence of consumer confusion, but a competitor using the term
“Pepsi” presumably doesn’t dilute the “Coke” mark. Determining whether
dilution exists, like determining likelihood of confusion, requires both a
metric for similarity and an audience to apply that metric.42 So while these
new theories may broaden the scope of trademark owners’ rights, they do
not change the fact that an audience must evaluate those rights.43
ordinarily prudent purchasers [will] be misled . . . .”). See generally Robert P. Merges et al.,
Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 882 (6th ed. 2012).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
39. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461 (2005) (describing the origins of the “merchan-
dising right theory”).
40. See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1601, 1684 (2010)
(arguing that modern trademark law “vacillate[s] between the captive attention of three
spheres: the sphere of the potential consumer, the corporate producer, and the larger
audience”).
41. E.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 39; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4; see also
Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 Tex. L.
Rev. 507 (2008) (criticizing the cognitive theories used to support dilution).
42. The nominal metric for similarity in dilution cases is “association,” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c), but it cannot be the case that association is sufficient similarity for dilution. Saying
“Pepsi” may well make people think of “Coke,” which is association of a sort, but not the sort
that dilution law would condemn.
43. In some respects, dilution and merchandising may make the consumer-audience is-
sues we discussed above easier. Consumers for a specific product may be a specialized group
with knowledge that jurors are unlikely to possess. By contrast, dilution law requires that the
mark be “widely recognized by the general consuming public,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2), so
jurors are more likely to be familiar with the marks at issue. The same is true of merchandis-
ing, which (so far at least) has been limited primarily to the sports and university contexts. See
Lemley, supra note 26.
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B. Patent Law
Unlike trademark law, patent law exists to encourage scientific and tech-
nological innovation for society’s benefit. Patent law sets the expert as the
target audience in IP infringement.
American patent law protects inventors of useful, novel, and nonobvious
inventions.44 Patents are granted after they successfully undergo examination
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, which considers whether an inven-
tion meets patentability conditions and whether the description in the pat-
ent application satisfies certain disclosure requirements.45 The patent right
permits the patentee to exclude others from practicing the patent’s claimed
invention for a limited time, typically twenty years from the date the patent
application was filed.46
Utilitarianism is the dominant justification for American patent law.47
According to utilitarian theory, patent law provides inventors with the in-
centive of exclusive rights for a limited duration to motivate them to create
technologically or scientifically valuable inventions. The theory is that public
benefits accrue by rewarding inventors for taking two steps they likely would
not otherwise take: to invent, and possibly commercialize, in the first place
and to reveal to the public information about these inventions, which serves
to stimulate further innovation.48 The Constitution grants Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries,” a utilitarian end.49
The rights patent laws confer are designed to be limited in time and
scope.50 Providing patent protection to creators is intended to encourage
them to produce socially valuable works, thereby maximizing social wel-
fare.51 If patent rights are too strong, society will be hurt (and social welfare
44. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006).
45. Id. §§ 112, 131.
46. Id. § 154(a).
47. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575,
1597–99 (2003); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (discussing patent
law as an incentive); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330–31
(1945) (noting that the patent system is designed to encourage invention for society’s benefit).
48. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 547–48 (2009).
49. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
50. Lemley, supra note 10, at 997.
51. See Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Stan-
dards, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 579, 592–96 (1985). Utilitarian thinking comes in different flavors
besides the traditional incentive-to-invent story. One is the prospect theory, which suggests
that inventors are rewarded with a patent right to centralize investment in the patented inven-
tion’s commercialization and improvement, which in turn benefits society. Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265, 266 (1977). Related to that
theory is advocacy for direct protection of commercialization because of its valuable role in
diffusing inventions. E.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Mar-
ket Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 337 (2008); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62
Stan. L. Rev. 341 (2010). For criticism of the commercialization theory, see Mark A. Lemley,
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diminished).52 For one thing, exclusive rights in IP can prevent competition
in protected works, allowing the rights holder to charge a premium for ac-
cess and ultimately limiting valuable works’ diffusion to society at large.53
For another, given that knowledge is frequently cumulative, society benefits
when subsequent creators can build on previous scientific and technological
creations to generate new works.54 For these reasons, patent laws ensure both
that the works they protect fall into the public domain in due course and
that third parties are free to use protected works for certain socially valuable
purposes.55
This overarching justification for patent law accords in significant ways
with patent law’s choice of the expert as the audience. Patent law requires
patentees to include in their patent “one or more claims particularly point-
ing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . .
regards as the invention.”56 The scope of the patent right—and thus the
question whether a defendant’s use has infringed a plaintiff’s patent right—
is based on these claims, which set out the metes and bounds of the paten-
tee’s invention.57 A defendant infringes a plaintiff’s patent if the fact finder
determines that the patent claims, as construed by the court as a matter of
law,58 cover a use made by the defendant.59
According to the Federal Circuit, claim terms are to be interpreted with
the “meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the
art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date
of the patent application.”60 This meaning is based on the specific expert
knowledge that the person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) has
combined with the contextual knowledge to be gleaned from reading the
The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 709 (2012). Another utilitarian approach is
the signaling theory, which proposes that patents are useful signals to financiers that the pat-
enting firm is a worthy investment. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625,
636–37, 648 (2002); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 37 (2005).
52. Lemley, supra note 10, at 996–97.
53. Id. at 996.
54. See id. at 997–98.
55. See id. at 999.
56. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
57. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Burk &
Lemley, supra note 14, at 1745; Fromer, supra note 14, at 726.
58. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that
claim construction is to be done by the judge); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1454–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (building on Markman to hold that claim construction is a question
of law, not fact).
59. See Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (observ-
ing that infringement is to be decided by a jury, even while claim construction is to be deter-
mined by a judge).
60. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. As one of us has pointed out elsewhere, “the time of
invention” and “the filing date of the application” are not in fact the same. Mark A. Lemley,
The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 102–05 (2005).
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entire patent.61 The Federal Circuit has explained that it uses the PHOSITA
as its audience because “patents are addressed to and intended to be read by
others of skill in the pertinent art.”62
To understand the meaning of claim terms from the PHOSITA’s vantage
point, the Federal Circuit has indicated that courts ought to turn to the
following evidence, in this order: the claim terms themselves; the rest of the
patent document; the patent’s prosecution history; and, as a last resort, evi-
dence extrinsic to the patent, such as expert and inventor testimony and
technical treatises and dictionaries.63 The Federal Circuit has explained that
expert testimony “can be useful to a court for a variety of purposes, such as
to provide background on the technology at issue, to explain how an inven-
tion works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects
of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to
establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular
meaning in the pertinent field.”64 But it is only useful to the extent that it
does not contradict evidence intrinsic to the patent itself.65
Even though courts do not prioritize extrinsic evidence offered by ex-
perts in construing patent claims, the PHOSITA—the expert—is still the
audience through whose eyes the intrinsic evidence is examined.66 But just
who is the PHOSITA? According to the Federal Circuit, the relevant art for
the PHOSITA is typically set based on the particular problem the inventor
sought to solve.67 The level of ordinary skill is based on six factors: “educa-
tional level of the inventor, type of problems encountered in the art, prior
61. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14.
62. Id. at 1313. The court has also emphasized that “[t]he importance of [the PHOSITA]
lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity” in analyzing patent validity. Ryko Mfg. Co. v.
Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For criticism of the PHOSITA standard as
putatively objective while in fact instantiating a particular view of the inventive process, see
Dan L. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 881, 891–92
(2011).
63. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–18.
64. Id. at 1318.
65. Id. at 1318-19. Extrinsic evidence—particularly evidence that is reconstructed for
litigation or is not targeted toward PHOSITAs—is considered less reliable than intrinsic evi-
dence because the goal is to reconstruct what a PHOSITA understood the claims to mean at
the time of patenting. Id.
66. In that sense, one cannot rely on intrinsic evidence alone, if one needs to know how
a PHOSITA would understand the patent contents itself. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents,
Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 Ind. L.J. 779, 789–92 (2011) (maintaining that the
PHOSITA is de-emphasized in claim construction by prioritizing intrinsic over extrinsic
evidence).
67. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1155, 1188–89 (2002). For further discussion on the PHOSITA, see Eisenberg, supra
note 5; Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. Res. & Educ. 433, 438 (1966); John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA—The Ubiquitous
and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 37 (1991); and
Joseph P. Meara, Comment, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent
Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 267 (2002).
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art solutions, rapidity of innovation, sophistication of technology, and edu-
cational level of active workers in the field.”68 The PHOSITA is “not . . . the
judge, or . . . a layman, or . . . those skilled in remote arts, or . . . [even]
geniuses in the art at hand.”69 Nor is the PHOSITA an actual inventor.70
Instead, the PHOSITA is a “juridical doppelganger,”71 a “hypothetical person
who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”72 This hypotheti-
cal PHOSITA also possesses ordinary creativity.73
The principal way of proving patent infringement is by determining that
the defendant’s use falls within the literal scope of the patent claims.74 But
that is not the only way. Infringement can also be found for uses that fall
outside the patent claims’ scope under patent law’s doctrine of equivalents.75
According to the Supreme Court, a patentee can “claim those insubstantial
alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but
which could be created through trivial changes.”76 Courts determine equiva-
lence with reference to
the purpose for which [a claim element] is used in a patent, the qualities it
has when combined with the other [elements], . . . the function which it is
intended to perform[, and] whether persons reasonably skilled in the art
would have known of the interchangeability of an [element] not contained
in the patent with one that was.77
Therefore, infringement pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents is also as-
sessed using the PHOSITA as the relevant audience.78
Expert audiences, then, are at the center of patent infringement cases
because patent law asks the fact finder to determine whether two things are
technically equivalent.79 That being said, there are some ways the fact finder
can employ an audience other than the expert to assess infringement. For
one thing, when the fact finder is asked to determine infringement, she must
68. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 449–50 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
69. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
70. Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 227, 235–36 (2009).
71. Burk & Lemley, supra note 67, at 1187; accord Janis & Holbrook, supra note 5, at 90
(calling the PHOSITA a “constructed audience[ ]”).
72. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
73. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
74. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception . . . not the rule . . . .”).
75. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
76. Id.
77. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
78. Burk & Lemley, supra note 67, at 1187.
79. Similarity is essential to all aspects of the patent-infringement inquiry: in assessing
whether claim terms encompass the defendant’s use, courts must determine how similar the
defendant’s use is to those claim terms. Similarity is used more overtly in making an inquiry
under the doctrine of equivalents.
1266 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:1251
decide whether the defendant’s use falls within the already-construed patent
claim scope. There is no rule on whose perspective the fact finder should use
to construe the function of the defendant’s product or process. In this sense,
the fact finder is afforded a minor opportunity to employ another audience
as part of assessing infringement.80
There are also some technological areas in which patent law does not in
practice heed its general rule of choosing the expert as audience. The most
notable example involves software patents. In this area, because the Federal
Circuit allows software to be claimed based on its function rather than on its
more detailed technical workings, infringement can be found when two
computer programs serve the same function, even if the software works in
very different ways.81 A consumer or ordinary reasonable observer might use
the purpose the software serves to assess similarity more generally, but a
software expert would not.82
80. Cf. Lemley, supra note 60, at 108 (“Claim construction determines the scope of the
patent, and the scope of the patent in turn determines whether it covers the defendant’s prod-
uct.”). Moreover, in a number of patent-infringement cases, the judge does not fully construe
the patent claim but instead leaves some construction issues to the jury to determine infringe-
ment. For example, in one case, a jury found infringement of a patent on an invention for an
orthopedic nail with a “curved shank” for the treatment of fractures in the humerus. Acumed
LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The trial judge had construed
“curved shank” to mean “a shank that has a bend or deviation from a straight line without
sharp corners or sharp angles.” Id. On appeal, the defendant challenged the construction as
insufficiently definite because the district court had not specified how sharp is too sharp. Id. at
806. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, reasoning that “a sound claim construction
need not always purge every shred of ambiguity. The resolution of some line-drawing
problems—especially easy ones like this one—is properly left to the trier of fact.” Id. Applying
this reasoning, the Federal Circuit held that “the accused product has a rounded-off six-degree
angle in its shaft. A reasonable jury could have found that in the context of this sort of nail, a
rounded bend of six degrees was not a ‘sharp angle.’ ” Id. Similarly, courts will not always
construe claim terms, concluding instead that the term is simple enough that the jury can
understand it. In such a case, it is the jury, not the court, that will assess similarity. But while
“construing the construction” gives some freedom to juries to decide what constitutes in-
fringement, the Federal Circuit has increasingly been going the other way, holding that any
dispute over the meaning of a construed claim term is a dispute of claim construction, not
infringement, and therefore must be resolved by the judge rather than the jury. Cordis Corp.
v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond
Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
81. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013
Wis. L. Rev. 905; see also Colleen V. Chien & Aashish R. Karkhanis, Functional Claiming and
Software Patents (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of L. Legal Studies Research Papers Series, Paper No.
06-13, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2215867 (providing empirical evidence of
overbroad functional claiming in software); cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in
Patent Law, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 75, 95–98 (2008) (arguing that obviousness in patent law
ought not to be assessed with regard to software’s function, as the Federal Circuit has some-
times suggested, but rather with regard to its conceptualization and implementation).
82. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(referring to “core functionality” as the purpose for which “software is purchased by
consumers”).
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With few exceptions, then, the expert is the audience for patent infringe-
ment.83 For this audience choice to work, the fact finder must be able to put
herself in the position of the expert. Patent law tries to address this challenge
by relying on expert witnesses to explain the technology while limiting the
amount of post hoc expert testimony on the meaning of patent claims and
relying instead on documentary materials in existence at the time of patent
filing.84 Patent law also gives the judge the role of assigning meaning to pat-
ent terms. Even though that job is really fact finding, not legal interpreta-
tion,85 it is arguably better suited to judges than juries because of their
increased exposure to patent-infringement suits.86
C. Copyright Law
Copyright law’s goals are relatively similar to patent law’s, although cop-
yright is directed at artistic works rather than scientific and technological
works. Copyright law sometimes uses the expert as the audience, at other
times the consumer, and at still other times the reasonable ordinary
observer.
Copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression,” including literary works, sound recordings,
83. For some patent claims, the relevant audience for infringement is instead a legal
expert. See Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy 28 (6th ed. 2013).
This is most frequently an artifact of patent claim construction. While we generally construe
patent claims from the perspective of a PHOSITA, we have certain words to which we assign
legal meanings regardless of what experts would understand those words to mean. See id. For
instance, patent law defines the term “comprising” as being open ended, so that the addition
of other elements beyond those listed in the patent claim does not avoid infringement. By
contrast, the term “consisting of” is closed, requiring the listed elements and only those ele-
ments. Id. Similarly, the term “means” in a patent claim creates a rebuttable presumption that
the claim element is a “means-plus-function” claim to which very different rules of infringe-
ment apply. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Com-
munity”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 321, 338
(2008). No engineer is likely to understand these differences unless he has been talking to
patent lawyers. Rather, it is the patent lawyer, both as drafter of patent claims and as reader,
who is the audience for these terms. See id. at 334.
84. Because patent cases are litigated well after the date of invention, John R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 237
(1998) (finding the average lag to be twelve years), looking to resources dating back to patent
creation can help with hindsight bias, which is a very real concern in assessing the obviousness
of an invention. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1391 (2006). Because the
real expert is likely to be someone working today, not years ago, fact finders may be more
likely to focus implicitly on what the expert knows today, not what experts knew at the time of
invention. The use of a hypothetical expert may help fact finders abstract away from hindsight
bias.
85. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444, 1473–76 (2010);
Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
877, 879 (2002).
86. See Fromer, supra note 85, at 1473–76.
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movies, and computer software code.87 To obtain copyright protection, au-
thors need only create a qualifying work.88 A copyright holder receives the
exclusive right to reproduce the work, distribute copies of it, and prepare
derivative works, among other things,89 typically until seventy years after the
author’s death.90 Copyright protection extends to the expression of particular
ideas rather than to the ideas themselves.91 Protection actually reaches well
beyond the literal work to works that are copied only in part or are substan-
tially similar,92 “else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”93
Utilitarianism has been the dominant justification for American copy-
right law.94 According to utilitarian theory, copyright law provides authors
with the incentive of exclusive rights for a limited duration to motivate them
to create culturally valuable works.95 Without this incentive, the theory goes,
authors might not invest the time, energy, and money necessary to create
these works for fear that free riders might cheaply and easily copy them,
thereby eliminating the authors’ ability to profit from their works.96 As with
patent law, the rights conferred by copyright laws are designed to be limited
in time and scope to ensure both that the works they protect fall into the
public domain in due course and that third parties are free to use protected
works for socially valuable purposes.97
Copyright infringement exists when a defendant actually copied the
plaintiff’s copyrighted work in a way that rises to the level of an improper
appropriation. To determine improper appropriation, we ask whether two
works are substantially similar.98 Circuit courts differ on the audiences they
87. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2012).
88. Id. § 102(a) (requiring only that a work be fixed in “any tangible medium of expres-
sion” to be copyrightable).
89. Id. § 106.
90. Id. § 302(a).
91. Id. § 102(b); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
92. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007); Whitehead v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 1999).
93. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
94. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); 122
Cong. Rec. 2834 (1976) (statement of Sen. John McClellan); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Fore-
seeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1576–77 (2009); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325,
326 (1989).
95. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1197
(1996).
96. Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too
Long?, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 651, 676 (2000) (statement of Wendy Gordon); Alina Ng,
The Author’s Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 453,
453 (2009).
97. Lemley, supra note 10, at 999.
98. We frequently also ask whether the works are similar to assess circumstantially
whether the defendant’s work actually copied from the plaintiff’s. E.g., Cavalier v. Random
House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002); Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131,
139–40 (2d Cir. 1992). Independent creation by the defendant is therefore a complete defense
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use as the reference point for determining substantial similarity, a decision
that often depends on the type of copyrighted work at issue. We detail the
different approaches of the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. Most other
circuits follow either the Second or Ninth Circuit in determining substantial
similarity.99
The Second Circuit generally considers the ordinary lay observer as the
relevant audience, although sometimes it uses a more discerning ordinary
observer or an expert in the relevant subject matter. In the foundational case
of Arnstein v. Porter, the singer Cole Porter was sued for copyright infringe-
ment of the plaintiff’s musical compositions.100 On the question of whether
Porter improperly appropriated the plaintiff’s work, the court held that “the
test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer; accordingly, on that issue,
‘dissection’ and expert testimony are irrelevant.”101 The court explained why
it chose this audience:
The proper criterion on that issue is not an analytic or other comparison of
the respective musical compositions as they appear on paper or in the
judgment of trained musicians. The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is
not, as such, his reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential
financial returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s
approbation of his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether defendant
took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay
listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is
composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which be-
longs to the plaintiff.102
The court called this as a question of fact for the jury, noting the jury’s
“peculiar[ ] fit[ness] to determine” this question.103 Without expressly saying
as much, the court seemed to see the jury as representative of the consumer,
so much so that it indicated that it would “be proper to exclude tone-deaf
persons from the jury,” as they would no longer be typical consumers.104
The court also intimated that a judge would be unlikely to be a consumer of
popular music and therefore that a judge trying such a case ought to employ
an advisory jury.105 This reasoning seemingly suggests that typical consum-
ers of the work ought to be the audience, even though the Second Circuit
to copyright infringement. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 74, 77
(2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). While using similarity to gauge actual copying also requires a
choice of audience, its ultimate purpose is distinct and is beyond the scope of this Article.
99. See generally Robert C. Osterberg & Eric C. Osterberg, Substantial Similar-
ity in Copyright Law §§ 3.1–3.2 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving
Copyright Infringement, 57 J. Copyright Soc’y 719 (2010).
100. 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946).
101. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. As to whether there was actual copying in the first place,
dissection and expert testimony are allowed to show that similarities exist that are unlikely to
have occurred by chance or by convention. Id.
102. Id. at 473 (footnotes omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 473 & n.22.
105. See id. at 473.
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cases applying Arnstein consistently specify a different audience construct:
the ordinary observer.106
According to Arnstein, expert testimony would be permissible on the
question of improper appropriation but only to help the jury determine the
reaction of ordinary lay listeners.107 In this instance, the Arnstein court rec-
ognized the translation problem for fact finders: even juror-consumers may
need expert testimony that focuses on how consumer attitudes as a group
potentially differ from the attitudes of individual jurors. Otherwise, the Sec-
ond Circuit—with more than a whiff of elitism—thought that expert views
would be irrelevant:
The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views
as to the musical excellence of plaintiff’s or defendant’s works are utterly
immaterial on the issue of misappropriation; for the views of such persons
are caviar to the general—and plaintiff’s and defendant’s compositions are
not caviar.108
In a dissent, Judge Clark stated that the majority’s test for substantial
similarity was too cramped. He would have allowed for dissection and ex-
pert testimony.109 He reasoned that “[m]usic is a matter of the intellect as
well as the emotions; that is why eminent musical scholars insist upon the
employment of the intellectual faculties for a just appreciation of music.”110
Moreover, he expressed skepticism about the lay jury’s ability to identify
improper appropriation:
I should not have thought it pre-eminently fitted to decide questions of
musical values, certainly not so much so that an advisory jury should be
brought in if no other is available. And I should myself hesitate to utter so
clear an invitation to exploitation of slight musical analogies by clever mu-
sical tricks in the hope of getting juries hereafter in this circuit to divide the
wealth of Tin Pan Alley.111
106. See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001).
107. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
108. Id. (footnotes omitted). In stating that such persons “are caviar to the general,” the
court acted doubly elitist in quoting from Hamlet without citing it. See William Shake-
speare, Hamlet act 2, sc. 2. One of us has argued that the court’s approach is exactly back-
wards, asking experts to decide things ordinary observers could determine and eschewing
these experts where they are most needed—in deciding what is protectable about the work.
Lemley, supra note 99, at 719.
109. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 476–77 (Clark, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 476 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 479. It seems clear that plaintiff Ira Arnstein himself was engaged in such
trickery; his theory of how Porter got ahold of his obscure songs was laughable, and the dis-
sent made its case by citing almost exclusively other Second Circuit cases that Arnstein brought
himself, suggesting that he was a frequent filer rather than someone with a real claim. See id. at
475–80. See generally Gary A. Rosen, Unfair to Genius: The Strange and Litigious Ca-
reer of Ira B. Arnstein (2012).
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Since Arnstein, the Second Circuit has held that the relevant copyright
infringement audience is the reasonable ordinary lay observer,112 describing
the test for similarity as whether “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to
detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their
aesthetic appeal as the same.”113
The Second Circuit has created a different rule for infringement cases
involving software. In software cases, because the ordinary lay observer lacks
sufficient understanding to compare the parties’ “highly complicated and
technical” software for similarity, the fact finder need not use the ordinary
lay observer as the audience.114 Instead, the software expert becomes the
proper audience.115 The Second Circuit has also suggested more generally
that expert testimony might be relevant when dealing with “art forms [that
are not] readily comprehensible and generally familiar to the average lay
person.”116
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a different two-part framework for as-
sessing substantial similarity, using both the expert and the ordinary reason-
able observer as the relevant audience. It applies both extrinsic and intrinsic
tests, finding infringement only if both indicate similarity.117 The extrinsic
test objectively compares the expressive elements of the two works at issue,
examining such elements as “articulable similarities between the plot,
themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of
events.”118 This comparison allows dissection of the works and often involves
expert testimony on an expert’s point of view,119 thereby using the expert as
its audience. By contrast, the intrinsic test is a “subjective comparison that
focuses on ‘whether the ordinary, reasonable audience’ would find the works
112. E.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992);
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1986).
113. Boisson v. Banian, 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Folio Impressions v.
Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite disal-
lowing the dissection of works to evaluate similarity, the Second Circuit has indicated that “a
‘more refined analysis’ is required where a plaintiff’s work is not ‘wholly original,’ but rather
incorporates elements from the public domain” because otherwise infringement might be
found based on similarity of public-domain elements of the parties’ works. See id. (quoting
Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991)).
In this case, a “more discerning” ordinary observer acts as the audience, asking if there is
“substantial similarity between those elements, and only those elements, that provide
copyrightability to the allegedly infringed compilation.” Id. (quoting Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi-
natown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But the audience is still an ordinary observer, not an expert.
114. Altai, 982 F.2d at 713.
115. Id. at 713–14.
116. Id. at 713.
117. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162–65 (9th Cir. 1977).
118. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kouf v.
Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
119. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
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substantially similar in the ‘total concept and feel of the works.’ ”120 This test
uses the ordinary reasonable observer as the audience, and accordingly it
does not allow for expert testimony.121 The Ninth Circuit uses the extrinsic
test with analytic dissection to determine the fact of copying and the holistic
intrinsic test to determine whether that copying was in fact unlawful.122
Although the intrinsic test is usually judged from the perspective of the
ordinary observer, the Ninth Circuit sometimes instead uses the consumer
as its audience for this test.123 For example, rather than employing an ordi-
nary reasonable observer, the Ninth Circuit considered video games to re-
quire an “extraordinary observer” as the audience: “a discerning 17.5 year-
old boy.”124
As the Ninth Circuit did with video games, the Fourth Circuit has
adopted the consumer as audience across its range of copyright infringe-
ment cases. The Fourth Circuit discussed the issue at length in Dawson v.
Hinshaw Music Inc., a copyright infringement case over a spiritual song:
When conducting the second prong of the substantial similarity inquiry, a
district court must consider the nature of the intended audience of the
plaintiff’s work. If, as will most often be the case, the lay public fairly repre-
sents the intended audience, the court should apply the lay observer for-
mulation of the ordinary observer test. However, if the intended audience
is more narrow in that it possesses specialized expertise, relevant to the
purchasing decision, that lay people would lack, the court’s inquiry should
focus on whether a member of the intended audience would find the two
works to be substantially similar.125
The Dawson court opined that the Second Circuit had misread Arnstein as
always requiring an ordinary observer as audience when in fact Arnstein in-
tended that the consumer—sometimes an ordinary observer, sometimes
120. Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822 (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d
1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)).
121. See Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485.
122. See Lemley, supra note 99 (arguing that this is backwards).
123. E.g., Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209–10, 210 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988).
One complication is that the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works might be directed at different
markets. The audience for Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman,” for instance, may overlap
only slightly with the audience for 2 Live Crew’s rap song “Pretty Woman.” See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In such a case, courts relying on a consumer
audience will have to identify the correct audience for infringement purposes.
124. Data East, 862 F.2d at 209–10, 210 n.6.
125. 905 F.2d 731, 736–37 (4th Cir. 1990) (remanding the issue of whether a spiritual
song should be judged by a lay observer or under a specialized observer test); accord Lyons
P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001).
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not—serve as the audience: “In light of the copyright law’s purpose of pro-
tecting a creator’s market, we think it sensible to embrace Arnstein’s com-
mand that the ultimate comparison of the works at issue be oriented
towards the works’ intended audience.”126
Copyright law’s use of varied infringement audiences is confused and
often depends on the particular circuit deciding the case. As a general mat-
ter, however, copyright uses a hybrid test, drawing on both the perspective
of the expert and that of a nonexpert observer (either the consumer or the
ordinary person).127
D. Design Patent Law
As Jason Du Mont and Mark Janis observe, design patents occupy an
awkward position in the IP pantheon.128 They are, as their name suggests, a
form of patent law, and the legal structure of the right is set up as a patent
right. Design patents are granted only if the design is new, original, orna-
mental, and nonobvious,129 and infringement cases proceed by comparing
the claims of the design patent to the accused design.130 But the history and
motivation for design patent law is influenced as much by trademark and
unfair competition rationales as by the goal of encouraging the creation of
new designs as an end in itself.131 And to the extent that encouraging new
designs is a purpose behind design patent law, copyright, not utility patents,
seems a more apt parallel.132 So design patents are in some sense an amal-
gam of utility patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
This doctrinal confusion is reflected in the process of selecting the audi-
ence for design patents. As we have seen, patent and trademark are virtual
antipodes when it comes to the audience used to assess infringement. Patent
law focuses on a hypothetical audience of experts, while trademark law os-
tensibly cares about both actual consumers’ reactions and the defendant’s
subjective intent.
The test for infringement of a design patent draws much more from
trademark than from patent law. Infringement is judged “in the eye of an
126. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 734. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has questioned, although not
resolved, whether different—expert—observers should be the audience for copyright infringe-
ment of architectural works. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1300–01 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
127. Copyright also requires an audience—at least implicitly—to resolve certain fair-use
issues, such as whether a defendant’s use was “reasonably perceived” as a parody. David A.
Simon, Reasonable Perception and Parody in Copyright Law, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 779, 780.
128. Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American Design Protection, 88
Ind. L.J. 837, 877–88 (2013).
129. 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 171 (2006).
130. Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 701 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
131. See Du Mont & Janis, supra note 128, at 843–46.
132. See supra Section I.C.
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ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives.”133
This test evokes an actual audience composed of reasonable purchasers, just
as the trademark test does. But the audience is asked a different question.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has spoken of “the resemblance . . .
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one suppos-
ing it to be the other,”134 the Federal Circuit has held that in design patent
law, it is the similarity between the claimed design and the defendant’s prod-
uct, not the likelihood of confusion, that determines infringement.135 The
result is a hybrid: the consumer audience from trademark law, asked to
make the rather more abstract assessment of expert-based technical similar-
ity from patent or copyright law.
Traditionally, the fact finder was required to channel the expert audi-
ence in one important respect: while the audience was composed of the or-
dinary observer, that observer was credited with knowledge of the prior art,
which meant that only similarities that were actually original to the design
patentee could form the basis for a finding of infringement.136 But in Egyp-
tian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the court abolished this long-standing point-
of-novelty test for design patents, which had required proof that the defen-
dant copied a novel aspect of the plaintiff’s design.137 The court replaced the
point-of-novelty test with the ordinary-observer test for infringement,
which asks whether an ordinary observer would think the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s designs were the same, even if the similarities were already
known in the art.138 In so doing, the court moved from an audience that was
more patent-like to one that is closer to audiences used in trademark or
perhaps copyright law.
***
Understanding these differences is itself valuable because the different
audiences lead each of the IP regimes to different tests for infringement. In
focusing on the audience, we offer a lens through which scholars and courts
can understand how and why different IP regimes define infringement dif-
ferently. We turn to those differences in Part II.
II. Possible Infringement Audiences
Although other variations exist, there are—as Part I demonstrates—
three principal possible audiences in IP infringement. First, the audience
133. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); accord Oakley, Inc. v. Int’l
Tropic-Cal, Inc., 923 F.2d 167, 169 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
134. Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528.
135. Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
136. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(describing the history).
137. See id. at 678.
138. Id. at 670, 678. For criticism of that decision, see Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty,
105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1253 (2011).
May 2014] The Audience in IP Infringement 1275
might be a consumer of the item that the relevant IP right protects, such as a
pharmaceutical drug, classical music, or soft drinks. Second, the audience
might be an expert in the particular subject matter of the IP, such as a
chemist for a pharmaceutical patent, a classical musician or musicologist for
a classical music composition, or a branding, marketing, or linguistics spe-
cialist or worker in the beverage industry for a soft-drink brand. Third, the
audience might be some reasonable ordinary observer outside the industry,
much like tort law’s “reasonable person” who determines whether conduct
was negligent.139 In this Part, we explore how the choice of audience influ-
ences each regime’s definition of infringement.
It is easy to see how these different audiences might answer the same
question—whether two specified items are identical or too similar to one
another—differently. Consumers might readily think that two drugs are
substitutes despite their different chemical formulations because they per-
form similarly in their eyes, while a chemist would think the drugs are dif-
ferent due to their dissimilar formulations. Consumers might think that two
cola drinks with different branding are dissimilar despite their very similar
recipes, while beverage experts focused on the ingredients might disagree.140
Classical-music consumers might think two compositions sound relatively
similar, while an ordinary reasonable observer might yet more readily find
similarity and a classical-music expert considerably less similarity. The
choice of audience can thus be outcome determinative.
Why do IP regimes choose one audience group as a reference point over
another? And why do they differ?
A. Consumer
One possible audience choice for assessing IP infringement—as seen in
varied ways in trademark, copyright, and design patent law—is the con-
sumer of the product or service associated with the particular IP right. Some
other areas of law are directly concerned with how consumers behave. Anti-
trust law, for instance, cares about real-world markets. Conduct by a mo-
nopolist is illegal if it helps the company acquire or maintain a monopoly.141
The question is not whether a person would consider the conduct to be bad
or outside the range of acceptable corporate conduct. Rather, the question is
whether the conduct will in fact have negative effects in the marketplace.142
The actual market is the audience against which we measure an antitrust
violation.143
139. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
140. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market
Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 Geo. L.J. 2055, 2086–87 (2012).
141. III Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 606a (3d ed.
2008).
142. IIIB id. at ¶ 782b.
143. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466–67 (1992).
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Choosing a consumer to measure whether an IP right has been in-
fringed makes sense when IP law is concerned with protecting rights holders
from substitutions in the marketplace.144 Consumers will find that particular
works are substitutes if they would tend to buy either one interchangeably.145
Oftentimes, consumers will identify two works as substitutes if they function
in much the same way.146 For example, consumers will likely find two
pharmaceuticals similar enough if they achieve the same effect with similar
side effects. They will find two songs similar enough if the songs sound alike
and are similarly enjoyable. They may find two tablet designs similar enough
if they look the same. Consumers will find two soft-drink marks similar if
the marks sufficiently resemble each other such that the consumers might
purchase the respective products thinking that they both come from the
same source. Notably, market substitution may or may not depend on the
technical similarity that an expert would measure between the two works.
Two drugs that both treat heart disease might be chemically similar, but
drugs that are chemically different might still serve the same function and
thereby work as market substitutes. By contrast, two sodas may be virtually
identical chemically and still not serve as market substitutes if customers are
conditioned to choose one over the other based on their prior experiences
with the brand.147
Because consumers as a class tend to focus on whether the uses for two
products are interchangeable, the consumer is likely to be the audience that
most directly measures whether the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s
work at issue in IP litigation substitute for one another in the marketplace.
When the consumer is the audience for IP infringement, then, market sub-
stitutes are more likely to be deemed infringing and thus third parties will be
discouraged from producing substitutes without permission from the rights
holder. For this reason, the consumer is an ideal audience choice for assess-
ing IP infringement when that form of IP law seeks to discourage third par-
ties from creating or distributing market substitutes of works protected by
an IP right.
144. We cannot presume that the very fact of litigation indicates that a substitute product
is harming the plaintiff in the marketplace. That might be true in some cases, but it also might
be that the plaintiff wants to claim rights beyond the marketplace in a separate space in which
the defendant is operating.
145. Our invocation of “market substitution” with regard to IP infringement can, but
does not necessarily, carry the precise meaning that the term has been given in the antitrust
context of “the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between
the product itself and substitutes for it.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324
(1962). There is a broader range of meanings. Principally, while antitrust depends on market
definition, IP cases too often turn on explicit or implicit conclusions about whether and to
what extent two products compete. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 140.
146. E.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing software in this way); cf. Anish
Vaishnav, Product Market Differentiation in Pharmaceutical Antitrust Cases: Evaluating Cross-
Price Elasticity of Demand, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 586, 616 (employing a functional per-
spective in the context of antitrust market substitution).
147. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 140.
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Interestingly enough, this means that when the consumer serves as the
audience in IP infringement and substitution is the test for similarity, con-
sumers ultimately enjoy the fewest market choices for a particular type of
work. That is, because market substitutes are more likely to be considered
infringements, in theory only one protected work per market is allowed. If a
consumer sees plastic pipes as interchangeable with metal pipes, an IP right
that prevents market substitution would allow the owner of one type of pipe
to prevent sale of the other. Choosing the consumer as audience, then, is not
highly protective of consumers themselves.
The consumer is not an ideal audience choice in IP infringement when
the IP law at issue is only intended to provide protection against copying the
protected thing and not against competition from another thing. If we think
society benefits from having multiple drugs to treat pain that work in differ-
ent ways, for example, the consumer audience is not well suited to reach that
result. Even if there are already pharmaceutical formulations for pain relief,
society as a whole might benefit greatly from a new formulation that accom-
plishes similar results because it might be helpful to a subpopulation that
does not respond to the preexisting formulations.148 Even if this is not the
case, the new formulation might generate further scientific research and
yield helpful results in other ways in the future.149 Or the formulation may
work by a completely different mechanism, even though that mechanism is
not transparent to the end user.150 A consumer assessing IP infringement of
a preexisting formulation by the new drug will often be inclined to find
sufficient similarity and thus infringement. That would discourage the crea-
tion of the new formulation, to society’s detriment. More generally, the con-
sumer’s inattentiveness to differences beyond market substitutive elements
could thus prove harmful to society.
A related issue is that consumers are not monolithic. Some people insist
on drinking Coke over Pepsi (or the reverse); others don’t care. Defining the
consumer as the audience requires us to make judgments about how many
consumers must agree on something. It also requires that we determine how
to account for the views of the remainder. A plausible measure is whether a
majority of the defined audience would find infringement. This majority
requirement aligns with the “preponderance of the evidence” standard
plaintiffs must meet on the issue of infringement.151 If the audience is a
hypothetical consumer, the alignment is perfect: the plaintiff must show that
148. Anne Stein, Pain Relievers: What Are the Differences?, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-13/news/sc-health-0112-pain-reliever-differen2011
0113_1_alcohol-warning-chronic-pain-tylenol (noting, for example, that ibuprofen is danger-
ous for people who take oral steroids or blood thinners, but acetaminophen is not).
149. On the disclosure value of IP rights and the potential benefit for research, see, for
example, Fromer, supra note 48, and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Infor-
mation?, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 545 (2012). For a more skeptical view, see Lemley, supra note
10, at 997.
150. See Fromer, supra note 48, at 547–54.
151. Cf. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (indicating that the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard is the norm for civil litigation).
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it is more likely than not that this hypothetical consumer would believe the
defendant infringed. But even if the consumer used as the infringement au-
dience is a real one, a reasonable translation of the preponderance standard
might be that more people in the audience would find infringement than
would not.152
Thus far, it might seem that consumers are especially likely to find simi-
larity or substitution—and thus infringement (and broader IP rights)—be-
cause they are less attuned than experts to differences between products.
That is not always the case. In fact, consumers and experts are both attuned
to differences between products, but they tend to focus on different factors
because they approach the products in different ways. Sometimes two things
that are technically the same from an expert’s point of view serve completely
different functional purposes, making consumers more likely to react to
those differences and find noninfringement than an expert focused on the
technical aspects would be. For example, a thumbnail image on a computer
may be a reduced copy of the original, but as a link in an image search
engine, it serves a different purpose than the original does.153 Consumers
may be more likely to respond to this transformed use in a different market
than an expert would because they focus not on the similarity of the ideas
themselves but on the different uses to which the two images are put.
When the consumer is the audience in IP infringement, there is a sec-
ond-order question of how to ascertain what the consumer thinks. One ap-
proach is to present the court with consumer surveys or expert testimony on
what consumers think.154 The fact finder can rely on that evidence to assess
whether consumers would find that the works at issue are too similar. The
fact finder in this approach is a neutral arbiter, taking evidence on what
actual consumers believe. Alternatively, fact finders themselves can be
treated as consumers who judge whether the litigated works are too similar
based on their own views in conjunction with the presented evidence.155 The
fact finders might then be asked their own opinion on whether consumers
152. We might want to set the margin lower than 50% to halt infringement before it
becomes pervasive in the marketplace. Take trademark law. There, courts tend to find infringe-
ment if as few as 10% of real consumers are likely to be confused. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text. The theory is that even 10% confusion can disrupt the market with ineffi-
cient deception and produce a substantial windfall for infringers. At the other end, there may
be circumstances, such as criminal copyright infringement, where the standard of proof is
heightened to beyond a reasonable doubt, United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 673 (2d
Cir. 1992), in which we want to be confident that a substantial majority of audience members
think there is infringement.
153. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Al-
though an image may have been created originally to serve an entertainment, aesthetic, or
informative function, a search engine transforms the image into a pointer directing a user to a
source of information.”).
154. E.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
227 (2d Cir. 2012).
155. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 & n.22 (2d Cir. 1946) (remarking that
the jury is “peculiarly fitted to determine” similarity in copyright infringement cases about
popular music and that “tone-deaf persons” ought to be excluded from the jury).
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would find the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works to be substitutive. In this
scheme, jurors are a set of putative consumers acting on their own beliefs as
a proxy for what other consumers likely believe.156
Each approach has its costs and benefits. Under our legal system, the
second option can only work when the fact finder (jury or judge) is actually
a consumer of the products at issue. Even then, however, there are concerns.
Juries often must be unanimous, and we might worry about market substi-
tutions for some consumer jurors but not others. When the threshold for
substitution is low (such as 10 percent of consumers overall157), even jurors
with personal knowledge of an IP issue for a product or brand must disre-
gard that knowledge to an extent and instead put themselves in the mindset
of the least sophisticated subset of consumers. Doing so may make it harder
for jurors to model the consumer audience because of the inherent challenge
in taking a position that is different from their own experiences.
Moreover, consumer fact finders sitting through a trial might have some
difficulties placing themselves in the mindset of consumers in the actual
marketplace. When comparing products in the marketplace, consumers
often browse the store aisles in a hurry or do some simple online research.
This is significantly different from the fact finder, who sits in a courtroom
and likely focuses for days during the trial on the litigated products and
comparisons between the two. The differences between the courtroom set-
ting and the marketplace might lead juror-consumers to reach a different
conclusion than they would in the marketplace.158
For products not directed at lay consumers, the problem is worse. Jurors
aren’t the consumers of, say, enterprise software; if a jury is to assess how
actual business consumers would view products of this type, courts must
provide them with sufficient evidence so they may assess whether the actual
consumer would find the litigated works to be too similar. While we might
156. Scholars recognize that so long as juries are generally representative of the public at
large, they are useful as proxies for that public. E.g., Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of
the Jury Trial Right, 84 Ind. L.J. 397, 398–06 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diver-
sity, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1099, 1108–09 (2005); Deborah Zalesne & Kinney Zalesne, Saving the
Peremptory Challenge: The Case for a Narrow Interpretation of McCollum, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev.
313, 326 (1993).
157. See supra note 152 (discussing this rule in trademark law); see also supra text accom-
panying note 37 (same).
158. Cf., e.g., THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 218, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The
failure of a survey [assessing consumer views] to approximate actual marketplace conditions
can provide grounds for inadmissibility [in a trademark infringement case].”); Dena Cox &
Anthony D. Cox, Beyond First Impressions: The Effects of Repeated Exposure on Consumer Liking
of Visually Complex and Simple Product Designs, 30 J. Acad. Marketing Sci. 119, 119 (2002)
(“[Consumers’] preferences for visually complex product designs tend to increase with re-
peated exposure, while preferences for visually simple product designs tend to decrease with
repeated exposure.”).
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rely on survey evidence and expert testimony, there are well-known con-
cerns with its accuracy and potential for manipulation.159
However the evidence is obtained, the consumer perspective is likely to
focus more on market substitution than on the technical similarity of the
works in question. The consumer as audience might, however, overlook
some distinctions that society deems valuable, thereby discouraging the cre-
ation of valuable works.
B. Expert
A second possible audience for adjudging infringement is experts in the
subject matter of the suit, whether it is software engineers for software pat-
ents or copyrights, musicologists or classical musicians for a classical-music
composition copyright, or a soft-drink branding expert for a cola trade-
mark.160 The expert is a sensible audience in IP infringement if the relevant
form of IP is concerned with ensuring that only works that the expert con-
siders sufficiently similar are prohibited.
An expert tends to find that one work in his field is too similar to an-
other when the work does not make a material technical contribution to the
expert’s field different from or above and beyond the other work’s contribu-
tion.161 To an expert, two works might be sufficiently dissimilar as long as
they work in different ways. As such, the expert as audience makes sense if
the form of IP at issue has the goal of encouraging a range of works that
make technically distinguishable contributions to the relevant field (and
concomitantly, if it has the goal of discouraging works that make no techni-
cally distinguishable contributions to the field). For instance, consider again
different pharmaceutical formulations. They might perform the same func-
tion in consumers’ eyes, but chemists might see the two as distinguishable
contributions to the field owing to their distinct formulations, each of which
159. See, e.g., Michael Rappeport, Litigation Surveys—Social “Science” as Evidence, 92
Trademark Rep. 957 (2002); Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Con-
sumer Survey in Litigation Under Trademark Opposition, Trademark Infringement, and False
Designation of Origin Provisions of Lanham Act (15 USCS §§ 1063, 1114, and 1125), 98 A.L.R.
Fed. 20 (1990). But see Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1303, 1351
(2012) (arguing that copyright law ought to use surveys in assessing substantial similarity,
much as trademark law does in assessing confusion).
160. It is possible that multiple subject-matter areas are at issue in a particular suit, which
complicates the choice of expert referent. Cf. supra note 123 (discussing this issue in the con-
text of copyright’s infringement test).
161. Psychologists and sociologists studying creativity generally understand it to be “a
process that generates a product or idea and possesses two qualities: newness and appropriate-
ness—appropriate in the sense that some community recognizes it as socially valuable.” Jeanne
C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1441, 1459–60 (2010)
(footnote omitted) (citing, inter alia, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the
Psychology of Discovery and Invention 25, 28–29 (1996), and R. Keith Sawyer, Ex-
plaining Creativity: The Science of Human Innovation 27 (2006)). According to this
understanding, experts in a field act as the domain’s gatekeepers and are essential to evaluating
creative contributions in the field. Id. at 1460–61 (citing Csikszentmihalyi, supra, at 6,
27–30).
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can be further researched and built upon.162 Consumers, by contrast, cannot
be counted on to distinguish the technical or specialized contributions that
the newer formulation makes from those of the preexisting formulations in
the marketplace. As another example, pop music has significant genre con-
straints, such as its limited use of particular chord progressions.163 Blues mu-
sic has basic tonal progressions.164 Consumers of these forms of music might
find two different songs to be overly similar precisely because of the relevant
genre’s constraints.165 Experts might not, however, because in adjudging
similarity they are more likely to ignore similarities that result from these
known constraints. To the expert, these similarities aren’t the result of copy-
ing the plaintiff’s work but of the inherent constraints of the science, the
artistic genre, or the relevant industry.
In addition to its value in encouraging technical contributions to the
relevant field, using experts as audience can effectively protect market com-
petition. If IP law permits variations from the expert’s perspective that do
not register as variations to the consumer, some number of market substi-
tutes would be considered noninfringing. As such, they are more likely to be
produced and will offer consumers a wider range of products at lower
prices. And if it is correct that competition drives innovation, allowing a
range of differentiated products may also best promote the goal of encourag-
ing new creation.166
Just as consumer decisionmakers don’t always vote for IP owners,167 ex-
pert analysis will not always favor narrower IP rights on the basis that ex-
perts notice many more differences than consumers would. Sometimes
surface differences can conceal what really are two products that operate the
same way from an expert’s perspective. For example, software programs
such as word processors or web browsers might have different interfaces,
persuading consumers that they are sufficiently different, but both programs
162. See supra text accompanying notes 148–150.
163. See Valeria M. Castanaro, Note, “It’s the Same Old Song”: The Failure of the Original-
ity Requirement in Musical Copyright, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1271,
1271, 1280–81 (2008); random804, Axis of Awesome – 4 Four Chord Song (with Song Titles),
YouTube (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pidokakU4I (demonstrating
how many popular songs share the same four chords).
164. See Sergiu Gherman, Harmony and Its Functionality: A Gloss on the Substantial Simi-
larity Test in Music Copyrights, 19 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 483, 484 (2009).
165. See Lund, supra note 2, at 152–73 (reporting experimental findings that lay listeners
are bad at assessing the similarity between musical compositions); cf. Castanaro, supra note
163, at 1271–74, 1280–81 (discussing how these genre constraints can cause problems for
copyright’s originality requirement).
166. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 609, 619–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research ed., 1962). For a review of the economic evidence supporting this position, see Mark
A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2005).
167. See supra text accompanying note 153.
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might be driven by source code that experts would find too similar.168 Simi-
larly, songs may contain certain individualized musical progressions that are
technically similar (and likely copied), even though a difference in genre or
lyrics makes lay ears significantly less likely to detect this similarity.169 And
ads that appear opposite search results may be driven by the use of trade-
marks in the search-engine algorithm, even though the actual ads the con-
sumer sees are silent about the trademark in question.170
While consumers focus on market substitution and largely ignore the
way things work under the hood, experts tend to focus on technical similar-
ity to the exclusion of market effect. Thus, an expert might be more likely
than a consumer to conclude that a defendant’s product infringed a patent
because it included the same technical contribution, even if the defendant
put that technology to a very different use that didn’t interfere with the
patentee’s market. If we want IP rights to cover only uses that cause market
harm, consumers are more likely than experts to reach that result.
The second-order question concerns how the fact finder can ascertain
the views of the expert. Because in the American litigation system fact find-
ers are not expected to be experts, employing the expert as audience requires
that the fact finder channel the beliefs of someone whose expertise they do
not usually possess.171 To render a decision on infringement, lay fact finders
will need evidence on what experts think. If that evidence comes in the form
of expert testimony, the law is faced with the usual concerns about the relia-
bility of the evidence, a possible battle of the experts, and the ability of
laypeople to process this evidence.172 There may be ways to mitigate these
concerns. For example, even if experts disagree about the particulars of the
case at hand, they might nonetheless largely agree about background mat-
ters, which can help the fact finder understand the relevant field. Expert
evidence might also come in the form of expert resources, such as textbooks
published around the time the work was created. Using these sources may
168. Cf. Model View Controller Explained, Tom Dalling (May 31, 2009), http://tomdalling
.com/blog/software-design/model-view-controller-explained (explaining the popular model-
view-controller software design, in which the source code that creates the graphical user inter-
face (the view) is separate from the code that reacts to actions (the controller) and the under-
lying data it controls (the model)).
169. Lund, supra note 2, at 152–73.
170. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127–31 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that
this practice by a search engine constitutes a use in commerce for purposes of trademark law).
171. If the fact finder does possess expertise (even if only indirectly, perhaps because the
fact finder has a preexisting sense of what experts think on this issue), some of these concerns
might be minimized and the analysis would be more similar to that of the fact finder as
consumer addressed above. See supra text accompanying notes 155–158.
172. See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process,
107 Yale L.J. 1535 (1998); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584–85 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (holding that expert testimony on claim construction is unreliable and should be
discouraged). In patent law, the use of a hypothetical expert helps reduce the significance of
the battle of expert witnesses. See supra Section I.B. Rather than finding a particular person
and asking him what he thinks, patent law tries to create a hypothetical person who can
channel all the evidence.
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avoid some concerns about expert testimony’s reliability, although it does
not alleviate many of the other concerns. Additionally, as discussed above,
patent law has a number of legal devices designed to limit the power af-
forded expert testimony.173
Moreover, lay fact finders might have a hard time putting themselves in
the expert’s shoes because individuals generally struggle to model people
dissimilar from themselves. Cognitive science studies demonstrate that peo-
ple tend to use themselves to simulate the mental states of others, particu-
larly when the person they are modeling is similar to them; when the person
is dissimilar, people often adjust their mental model by making some
changes to their own.174 When people recognize the great mental distance
between themselves and another, they might resort to stereotyping in order
to model the other.175 These studies therefore cast some doubt on how well
lay fact finders can model experts as the audience in IP infringement.176
Using judges rather than juries as fact finders when the audience is the
expert might alleviate these problems to some extent. While judges are not
immune from cognitive biases,177 because judges see more cases than juries
and do so over a longer period of time, they might develop better models of
the expert to use as reference points when making infringement determina-
tions.178 At a minimum, they will see more experts and be more capable of
evaluating a particular expert relative to her peers.
In sum, the expert is a sensible choice for audience in IP infringement
when the IP regime wants both to encourage new technical contributions to
the relevant field and to discourage works that make no material technical
173. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
174. Daniel R. Ames, Inside the Mind Reader’s Tool Kit: Projection and Stereotyping in
Mental State Inference, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 340, 340 (2004); Nicholas Epley et
al., Perspective Taking as Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment, 87 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 327, 327 (2004); cf. Donn Byrne, Interpersonal Attraction and Attitude Similarity, 62
J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 713, 713 (1961) (“Studies in a wide variety of settings have
shown that physical and functional distance influence interaction and interpersonal attrac-
tion.”). But cf. Bertram F. Malle, The Actor-Observer Asymmetry in Attribution: A (Surprising)
Meta-Analysis, 132 Psychol. Bull. 895, 895 (2006) (demonstrating that the actor–observer
asymmetry is less robust than has been assumed).
175. Epley et al., supra note 174, at 328.
176. Cf. Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 317, 322 (2009) (“The question . . . is why legal scholars take it for granted that jurors
can make accurate mental-state determinations. . . . [G]iven the significant cognitive demands
that contemporary criminal law imposes on jurors, it is far from obvious that they can. The
answer seems to be that legal scholars embrace, implicitly or explicitly, a commonsense theory
of mental-state attribution in which mindreading seems neither particularly complicated nor
particularly problematic.”).
177. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 816 (2001).
178. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 83–84 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009)
(1881) (arguing that judges are better decisionmakers than juries because judges’ repeated
exposure to particular situations provides them with a better basis on which to decide cases).
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contribution to the field. But reliance on an expert audience presents diffi-
cult second-order issues because lay fact finders will have trouble modeling
that expert audience.
C. Ordinary Reasonable Person
A third possible choice of audience in IP infringement is the ordinary
reasonable person. The ordinary observer is a hypothetical person, a reason-
able individual with attributes drawn from the general population, but not
necessarily a consumer of the particular product at issue or indeed reflective
of any real person at all.
The law relies on hypothetical people at various points. Most notably,
negligence in tort law is determined from the perspective of the “reasonable
person.”179 This reasonable person is not the median actual person or even
an amalgam of real people. This person is a hypothetical construct, pos-
sessed of characteristics that don’t necessarily map onto any real person.180
The ordinary reasonable person might seem like the consumer, but there is
an important difference: the “reasonable” moniker gives courts some leeway
to modify the actual consumer’s views in the interest of serving legal goals.
In tort law, for instance, a person is considered to have acted unreasonably
“if he or she takes less than the socially optimal level of care.”181 The justifi-
cation for this standard is that it “forces potential injurers to take into ac-
count, or internalize, the externalities of inefficient conduct, thereby
preventing such conduct.”182 A real person may have no idea of the optimal
level of care, but the choice of the hypothetical reasonable observer gives
courts the freedom to attribute to the audience some of the characteristics of
a legal expert.
Similarly, in IP infringement, one might see choosing the ordinary rea-
sonable observer as the audience as an attempt to prevent infringers from
copying only in instances where reasonable people would detect similarities
in a way that the law would care about. As in tort law, this choice presumes
that fact finders have sufficient information at their disposal to distinguish
reasonable from unreasonable conduct, a questionable assumption.183 But it
may provide room for the law to establish certain norms of permissible con-
duct, allowing courts to define some beliefs as unreasonable no matter how
179. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 173–92 (5th
ed. 1984).
180. See generally Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
323, 371 (2012) (discussing whether the law ought to rely on normative or positive considera-
tions in constructing the reasonable person). The two audience possibilities previously dis-
cussed—the expert and the consumer—might also be hypothetical. In fact, that is the case in
patent law, where the audience reference point is a hypothetical expert who has ordinary
knowledge and creativity. See supra Section I.B.
181. Miller & Perry, supra note 180, at 328.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 336–40.
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widely they are held. For this reason, either a judge or a jury might model
the ordinary observer.
Perhaps most importantly, compared to actual consumers and experts,
the hypothetical observer is less likely to notice differences between litigated
works. Unlike the expert, this observer probably knows little about the genre
of any particular litigated work, which minimizes the chance that she will be
attuned to similarity based on characteristics that matter in that genre. And
compared to the consumer, the ordinary reasonable observer is less attentive
to considerations that litigated works might be comparable as consumed
goods because she does not approach the issue with the works’ respective
functions in mind. Cast in this light, the reasonable ordinary observer is
worthy as an audience only when the relevant form of IP law wants to find
infringement more readily and without any attention to genre or market-
place substitutions; that is, if it wants to deter works that are less similar
than an expert or consumer would find.184
***
As this Part demonstrates, different audiences (and fact finders, for that
matter) can readily provide varying determinations on infringement. The
choice of audience therefore ought to be made carefully with regard to the
desired goals of each form of IP law. Understanding this fact helps explain
many of the differences in IP infringement doctrine.
III. The Consumer and the Expert as Touchstones
The payoff from focusing on the audience in IP infringement goes be-
yond simply understanding why our infringement regimes look so different.
It can also prompt us to think normatively about what should constitute
infringement. Having provided a background on the audience choices that
the various IP regimes actually make and an analysis of why the choice mat-
ters, we now consider which audience the various IP regimes ought to em-
ploy in infringement cases.
Is there a justification for various IP regimes using different audiences?
Intuition might suggest that each regime ought to pick the audience that
best accords with its underlying goals. Given the particular focus of each
statute, as described in Part I, it might then seem that each regime has care-
fully chosen its audience for IP infringement to match its particular goals.
We suggest that this intuition is, if not wrong, incomplete. Despite dif-
ferent features, the various IP regimes share at least one common goal: en-
couraging creation by giving creators a limited measure of market control.
184. It is not logically necessary that an ordinary reasonable observer notice fewer differ-
ences than the other audiences. One might imagine that such an observer knows the standard
of care in the field and would observe just as much, if not more, difference than the other
audiences. That said, courts seem to understand the ordinary reasonable observer in IP in-
fringement cases as unobservant of differences. See, e.g., supra Section I.C.
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We think this goal is best served when each type of IP infringement requires
proof of similarity from both the expert’s and consumer’s point of view.
Related to the question of the best audience is the question of what
exactly we want the audience to decide. Should the audience simply relate its
factual belief about similarity, which the fact finder would then use to in-
form its normative determination as to infringement? Or should the audi-
ence also directly make some normative determination about whether the
similarity is sufficiently problematic to rise to the level of infringement? We
refer to the ultimate decisionmaker in a trial as the “fact finder,” suggesting
that its job in channeling the audience involves determining facts about the
state of the world. In practice, however, we also charge fact finders with
doing more than finding facts. We sometimes charge them with making a
normative assessment of those facts in order to determine the ultimate ques-
tion of culpability. A jury that finds the defendant negligent in a tort case is
not merely discovering a fact about the world; it is making a judgment that
the defendant’s conduct deserves punishment because it falls below an ap-
propriate standard of conduct.185 The jury is channeling an audience (there,
the hypothetical reasonable person), but it not only uses the lens of the
reasonable person to find facts but also to make normative moral
judgments.
The same can be true in IP cases. For example, copyright law requires
not only evidence that the defendant did in fact copy from the plaintiff but
also evidence that the copying rose to the level of improper appropriation.186
The latter assessment requires a judgment as to how much copying is re-
quired for liability. Even trademark law, which focuses quite heavily on what
consumers in the real world think, does not stop with that evidence, instead
using it as part of a multifactor test.187 Patent law, by contrast, seems to ask
only the fact-finding questions in its infringement analysis: the question is
whether the defendant’s product has all the elements of the patent claim, not
whether the similarity was substantial enough to warrant liability. But the
normative judgment in patent law is folded into the claim-construction pro-
cess, which defines the scope of the invention for the purpose of ascertaining
infringement.188 In each case, then, determining infringement is at least in
part a normative as well as a purely factual question.
A. Experts and Technical Similarity
Expert-based similarity matters across the range of IP infringement
cases because the theory of all IP infringement is that the defendant is using
something that makes no material contribution to the relevant field beyond
the plaintiff’s preexisting contribution.
185. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 148, at 354–55 (2000); Francis H. Bohlen,
Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 113 (1924).
186. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2001).
187. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
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Take patent law. For society’s benefit, patent law seeks to encourage the
development of a multitude of useful scientific and engineering inventions,
including inventions that accomplish similar or identical functions in differ-
ent ways.189 Measuring similarity from the vantage point of the expert rather
than the consumer ensures that patent infringement is found only when the
defendant’s product embodies an inventive principle that is too similar to
the plaintiff’s. If the defendant’s product constitutes a material contribution
to the field, by contrast, approaching the same end in a different way, an
expert would not find it infringing.190
The expert as audience thus aligns with the goal of encouraging valuable
contributions to science and technology.191 It rewards the patentee who
makes a contribution to her field by ensuring that the use of her invention
remains off limits to those without her permission.192 At the same time,
patent law’s focus on technical similarity is a limitation on the scope of the
patent. Subsequent inventors can develop a variety of items that consumers
view as substitutes for the patented invention but that are not technically
similar without running afoul of patent law. That improvers are free to in-
vent around a patent or to apply an idea to a new and different end benefits
consumers and helps drive the progress of science and technology.193
Consider Velcro. Velcro has a different fastening mechanism than, say,
zippers, even though both have a similar function in fastening clothing. Even
if consumers in the marketplace for clothing might generally substitute one
for the other, engineers would not consider them to be substitutes because
of their different characteristics, such as Velcro’s relatively greater strength
and its distinctive fastening mechanisms.194 Engineers would consider Velcro
as an important contribution to their field distinct from the zipper. For one
thing, unlike the zipper, Velcro might be used to make further advances in
science and technology. Indeed, Velcro may turn out to hold a human heart
together in artificial-heart surgery, something we would be reluctant to try
189. See supra Section I.B.
190. Patent law’s focus on technical similarity prevents fact finders from finding that a
defendant infringes merely because it competes with the plaintiff’s product. At least, it should.
For an argument that software patents have lost sight of this limitation, instead patenting the
problem being solved rather than the particular solution the patentee invented, see Lemley,
supra note 81.
191. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 993–94.
192. See id. at 994.
193. See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[Pat-
ent] polic[ies] that legitimate design-around efforts should always be encouraged as a path to
spur further innovation.”); John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than “Off Switches”:
Patent-Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1399, 1406–09 (2012). But see Staff of
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, & Copyrights, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., An Economic Review of the Patent System 51 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by
Fritz Machlup) (“The production of the knowledge of how to do in a somewhat different way
what we have already learned to do in a satisfactory way would hardly be given highest priority
in a rational allocation of resources.”).
194. See Allyn Freeman & Bob Golden, Why Didn’t I Think of That? 99–103 (1997).
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with a zipper.195 Moreover, Velcro’s invention ultimately led engineers to
different sorts of subsequent innovation building on it. Velcro’s shortcom-
ings in certain contexts—such as the noise it makes when a soldier opens the
pockets on his uniform (in situations when the soldier needs to stay
quiet)—led to a valuable innovation: the military’s invention of a noiseless
Velcro.196 Furthermore, because Velcro’s inventor modeled the product on
the burrs of the burdock plant, its creation has helped develop more broadly
the field of biomimicry, which uses natural principles as inspiration to solve
other challenges.197
Society ought to encourage the development of products like Velcro,
even if the typical consumer will not distinguish between Velcro and zippers
for the particular use of fastening a shoe. Conversely, we probably should
not worry about encouraging uses of preexisting scientific or technological
contributions that make no further contribution to the relevant field—those
an expert would judge to work in the same basic way. In fact, we might want
to deter this kind of use.
At the same time, an expert’s focus on technical similarity will mean
that he is inclined to look past the actual use of the technology to the under-
lying way the technology works. To an expert, Velcro used to fasten shoes
and Velcro used to hold the human heart in place are not different technical
inventions but simply different market applications of the same basic scien-
tific principle. So while experts are less likely to find infringement when the
technical contribution has changed, they are more likely to find infringe-
ment when the technical contribution is the same, even if the market context
has shifted.
A similar story can be told about artistic works covered by copyright
law. Western art experts generally devalue close imitations of famous paint-
ings.198 But experts would likely find appropriation art by Jeff Koons or
Shepard Fairey to make material artistic contributions, even though their
pieces are clearly imitations of others’ prior works, because the experts see a
significant artistic effort in the imitation.199 Music experts may find similari-
ties in musical values and chord progressions that a lay audience would
more readily overlook because of substantial differences in the lyrics or the
195. American Physical Society, This Month in Physics History: February 9, 1990: Death of
George de Mestral, APS News, Feb. 2004, at 2, available at http://www.aps.org/publications/aps
news/200402/history.cfm.
196. Joe Schwarcz, Dr. Joe & What You Didn’t Know: 177 Fascinating Questions
about the Chemistry of Everyday Life 178–79 (2003).
197. See generally Janine M. Benyus, Biomimicry (2002).
198. See, e.g., Copies and Forgeries: What Difference Does It Make?, Leopold Segedin
(2005), http://www.leopoldsegedin.com/essay_detail_copies.cfm.
199. See, e.g., Angelina Krahn, In Defense of Banality, Milwaukee Express (Aug. 30,
2008), http://expressmilwaukee.com/article-3409-in-defense-of-banality.html (“[Koons’s] abil-
ity to transform Pop junk into high art is indebted to Warhol, Duchamp and Dali, all of whom
he borrows from liberally.”).
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basic melody.200 But they may also see that similarities that catch the atten-
tion of lay audiences are in fact driven by standard elements, such as chord
progressions, that the copyright owner didn’t invent.201 Experts are likely to
focus more on the technical work of the copyright owner and the defendant
and less on similarities or differences that a consumer would consider
significant.
Experts can serve a similar role in design patents. Design experts will
emphasize the novelty of the contribution in the patentee’s design. They are
less likely than consumers to be swayed by similarities that are driven by
standard design principles or that are well known in the art. But they may be
more likely to find similarity when two seemingly disparate works in fact
share a distinctive underlying design.
Promoting the proliferation (or at least a healthy number) of new works
is central to making progress in knowledge and culture, the underlying goal
of copyright and design patent law.202 Doing so ensures contributions to the
fields of painting, music, and design, while deterring the sorts of technical
similarity and replication that do not advance the field from an art expert’s
point of view. Relying on experts as the audience in copyright and design
patent infringement cases will tend to focus the infringement question on
whether the defendant’s work makes a material contribution beyond the
plaintiff’s.
The role of the expert in trademark law is less obvious. Marks are not
“technical” in the same sense as inventions or even music, so there might
seem to be less need for an expert to assess similarity in trademark than in
other areas of law. But expertise still has a role to play in trademark law.
Consumers sometimes focus on aspects of a brand or product package that
the law doesn’t want one company to control. Functional aspects of a prod-
uct configuration and generic and descriptive terms may actually serve as
signifiers to consumers, but we are reluctant to extend trademark protection
to those elements because doing so would interfere with the competitive
market that trademark law is ultimately supposed to promote.203
Determining such matters requires reference to experts in the field, not
just consumer perceptions. For one thing, experts in the underlying good or
services and the associated industry can provide insight into why marks look
similar to one other: Is the use of a mark necessary to describe a product
(because (1) it is a functional component of the product, (2) it is descriptive
or generic with regard to the product, or (3) consumers will subconsciously
view it more favorably), or is it instead an attempt to capitalize on a trade-
mark holder’s goodwill? Thus, an expert on fashion might explain why it is
200. See supra text accompanying note 169.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 163–165.
202. See supra Sections I.C–D.
203. See Fromer, supra note 13, at 1904–09 (evaluating why trademark law discourages or
forbids protection for generic and descriptive marks); McKenna, supra note 24, at 86–87 (dis-
cussing the theory for excluding functional marks).
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necessary to allow those who make monochromatic red shoes to use accom-
panying red soles—even if someone else holds trademark rights in red so-
les—but also why the makers of shoes in other colors do not need the same
freedom.204
Second, branding (or linguistics) experts can identify and distinguish
what is new and distinctive about a mark or product configuration from
similarities that are driven by the standard elements of a product, logo, or
brand. In that sense, a branding expert might pay attention to how the
choice of colors or shapes in a logo or even the linguistic structure of an
invented word is dictated by the literature on how consumers react to de-
sign. From the branding expert’s viewpoint, similarities between a plaintiff’s
trademark and the defendant’s use might be minimized if the only things
they have in common are standard marketing techniques understood to ap-
peal to particular consumers.205
The ultimate purpose of trademark law is to promote free competition
and fair commerce.206 The law ought to protect brands without interfering
with free competition.207 The expert perspective can help keep the law from
locking up important words, designs, or product configurations, and there-
fore their perspective is critical in any trademark infringement case.
More generally, the expert audience is central to the idea that a defen-
dant infringes an IP right only by taking some substantial portion of what
the plaintiff contributed to the world. When a work makes a material contri-
bution above and beyond those already made in the field, it ought to be
encouraged (often with an IP right of its own), not considered an infringe-
ment. Conversely, there is no similar need to encourage works that do not
make a material contribution to the relevant field.
B. Consumers and Market Substitution
The importance of the expert perspective in all areas of IP does not
mean, however, that the consumer’s perspective is irrelevant. Quite the con-
trary. Consumers as a class are, at least in theory, more attuned than experts
to whether the defendant’s product substitutes for the plaintiff’s in the mar-
ketplace.208 Market substitution—whether consumers view particular works
204. Cf. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
212 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a trademark holder to a lacquered red sole on footwear
cannot hold such rights as against the seller of monochromatic red footwear with a similar red
sole, even though the trademark is otherwise generally valid as against others).
205. By the same token, similarity might be maximized when both parties use the plain-
tiff’s selling innovation, such as adoption papers for dolls. Cf. Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 74–75 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the owner of the
Cabbage Patch Kids trademark for dolls is entitled to injunctive relief from American sales of a
Spanish version of the dolls lacking the same adoption process as the trademarked dolls even
though the adoption process is a central aspect of the dolls’ desirability).
206. See supra Section I.A.
207. See supra Section I.A.
208. See supra Sections II.A–B.
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as interchangeable—matters because IP rights are designed to serve the so-
cial purpose of encouraging valuable products, goods, or services to be cre-
ated and made available in the marketplace, not merely to allocate
ownership or enforce some moral right.209 IP rights impose costs on society,
so we want them to be asserted only when the IP owner faces market risk
from infringement.210
We could say that Coca-Cola has the right to prevent anyone from using
the word “Coke” in any context whatsoever, from advertising a competing
product to parodying the soda to writing about it in a newspaper or even
talking about it at a dinner party. But we don’t do that because such uses do
not cause any market harm to Coca-Cola.211 The terms appear similar (in-
deed, identical) to the expert, but the defendant’s use isn’t competing with
or substituting for the plaintiff’s; their respective uses are directed at entirely
different markets.212 Similarly, an accused hook-and-eye closure must act as
a substitute to consumers in the marketplace in order to cause harm to the
inventor of Velcro, just as one artist’s painting must act as a substitute for
other paintings in the marketplace in order to cause harm to the owner of
those paintings. The inventor of a fastener for shoes isn’t necessarily entitled
to control the use of a similar fastener in heart surgery. The technical princi-
ple is the same, but that doesn’t mean we want to prevent the use of that
principle in a completely different context. Similarly, one who takes a photo-
graph of President Obama isn’t necessarily entitled to control a painting
made from that photograph.213 Using the photograph in a completely differ-
ent context may be copying the photograph as a technical matter, but if the
photograph is used for a transformative purpose in a different market, we
generally don’t want the copyright owner to control that use.
Market substitution, like similarity from an expert’s vantage point, is
tied to IP’s goal of encouraging innovation. A use that does not interfere
with the IP owner’s market generally does not interfere with the incentives
to innovate that IP rights create. In fact, IP owners’ efforts to take control
over the use of their works in completely different markets create the biggest
209. See supra Part I (describing the underlying goals of the various IP regimes).
210. See supra Part I (describing this as a limitation in various ways on the different IP
regimes).
211. Some of the uses may cause harm, but the harm is attributable not to the use of the
term itself but to lawful competition or other behavior. If Pepsi persuades consumers that it is
better or cheaper than Coke, any harm is not attributable to the use of the term “Coke” in the
advertisement. Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994) (observ-
ing that in copyright, a scathing review that suppresses the market for the original is not an
infringing use). For an argument that trademark infringement should require proof of injury,
see Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 448–48
(2010). For an argument that that injury must come in a relevant market, not merely allow the
trademark owner to claim control of its mark in all markets, see Lemley & McKenna, supra
note 4.
212. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4.
213. These were the facts of the Associated Press’s copyright suit against Shepard Fairey
for painting the Obama Hope poster. See William W. Fisher III et al., Reflections on the Hope
Poster Case, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 243, 245–254 (2012).
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problems for the IP system, from trademark owners’ attempts to control
parodies, merchandise, and uses on unrelated goods to copyright owners’
attempts to control transformative uses of a picture in a search engine or a
work of history and efforts by “nonpracticing entities” or patent trolls to
prevent the use of an invention developed in one context to drive a product
in an entirely different context.214
Like many other areas of law, the consumer or market perspective
should include objective as well as subjective components. That is, while the
law should care about what actual consumers think, it should also impose
constraints on what beliefs the law should credit. Many areas of law—such
as the Fourth Amendment’s protection when there is an expectation of pri-
vacy—require both subjective and objective evidence: in this Fourth
Amendment context, a defendant’s expectation of privacy must be both ac-
tual and reasonable so as to ensure that the expectation actually existed and
is one to which the law wants to give credence.215 Similarly, proof of market
harm should require both evidence that consumers actually find the goods
to be substitutes and a conclusion that those consumers’ beliefs are reasona-
ble and therefore something the law wants to credit.216
C. Testing Both Technical Similarity and Market Substitution
For these reasons, we think that as a general matter, IP laws should find
infringement only when a work is too similar to a protected work, judged
from both the expert’s and consumer’s vantage point.217 Accordingly, the
proper audience in IP infringement cases is both the expert and the
consumer.218
214. Consumers may change their views over time as to whether works are market substi-
tutes. For example, consumers might initially see two pain relievers with different chemical
formulations as market substitutes, but if one becomes known to have certain side effects or
benefits that the other does not, consumers might no longer see them as substitutes. Or works
that consumers originally interpret to be different—say, shoelaces and Velcro—later come to
be seen as substitutes for one another. If market relationships change over time, the relevant
period is the time of infringement; that is the period during which defendant’s actions would
harm an IP owner in the marketplace.
215. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
216. For a related discussion on the extent to which IP law serves as a “norm entrepre-
neur” rather than a “norm follower,” see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12.
217. Another path to a similar end might be to assess infringement from the expert’s
point of view alone and then impose damages or other remedial measures only in proportion
to market harm from the consumer’s perspective. Cf. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J., sitting by designation) (dismissing a patent infringe-
ment case after a finding of infringement on the basis that there were no damages to the
plaintiff). Alternatively, a similar result can come about through standing rules: say, by permit-
ting standing to sue for infringement only when there has been harm to the plaintiff in the
marketplace and then assessing infringement only from the expert’s point of view.
218. The third possibility, the ordinary person, seems to serve less of a clear purpose and,
generally, courts that use the ordinary observer do so as a distorted proxy for the views of the
consumer. As such, we do not discuss it further here. For discussion and criticism of the
ordinary-observer standard, see Manta, supra note 159. When there is strong reason to believe
May 2014] The Audience in IP Infringement 1293
Under our approach, products that are substitutes in the eyes of con-
sumers but not too similar in the eyes of experts will not be deemed to be
infringing, just as products that are similar enough to satisfy experts but that
consumers don’t consider substitutes will not be deemed to be infringing.
Using both the consumer and the expert as the audience has two major
effects. First, it allows defendants to sell products that compete with the IP
owner’s product but work in different ways from an expert’s vantage point,
thereby both expanding consumer choice and lowering prices. IP rights are
not intended to control entire markets. If a defendant can compete by intro-
ducing a different product, the law should encourage it to do so. Using ex-
pert audiences to focus on technical similarity promotes that goal. It permits
many strands of research and creativity to proceed in parallel, and much of
that research will lead to even greater advances and contributions in both
related and unrelated ways.219
Second, our approach allows a third party to engage in a use that
doesn’t create market harm because it doesn’t substitute for the plaintiff’s
actual or likely future products. This permits a variety of transformative
reuses of both creative and inventive works, which not only increases dis-
semination of creative works but also allows for the sorts of remix and user
creativity that may themselves be essential to human flourishing.220 And it
does so without imposing any significant cost on the IP owner, who does
not face market substitution. The consumer audience is best suited to distin-
guish between things that interfere with the IP owner’s market and those
that don’t because the consumer’s focus is likely to be more functional and
market-regarding than an expert’s.
For this approach to work, we must have some conception of the market
in which the IP owner has interests. If IP owners are free to argue that the
entire world is their market because they could demand a license fee in ex-
change for not suing someone who uses their work in a particular way, the
market substitution test becomes circular and ultimately empty.221 The pre-
cise definition of the market is a subject for future work, but as a general
matter, we think IP owners should have to show either that they sell a rele-
vant product in the same market as the defendant or that they are likely to
enter that market in the near future.222
An alternative, broader formulation would cede to IP owners rights in
those markets in which they can show an established practice of licensing.
in a particular context that the expert view might be a proxy for the consumer view or vice
versa, an IP infringement inquiry can investigate the views of just one of these audiences to get
a sense of both of them.
219. See Fromer, supra note 48, at 547–54.
220. E.g., Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hy-
brid Economy (2008); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent
Doctrine, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 467 (2008).
221. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, Law & Con-
temp. Probs., Spring 2007, at 185; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4.
222. See also supra note 145 (discussing the relationship of our invocation of “market
substitution” to its application in antitrust law).
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This would be consistent with copyright’s current approach to fair use223 and
with patent law’s current view that patentees should be paid a reasonable
royalty even without market substitution.224 A consumer audience might
adopt a similar approach; that certain uses are traditionally licensed while
others are not might be reflected in consumer instincts that an IP owner
deserves to be paid.225 But a focus on already established licensing markets is
intellectually unsatisfying because it presumes the status quo as an arbitrary
baseline.
With these tentative thoughts on market substitution, we turn to the
role that market substitution and technical similarity ought to play in IP
infringement.
1. Bringing Market Substitution to Patent Law
That market substitution ought to matter to patent infringement sug-
gests a need to rethink important aspects of patent law. The market substitu-
tion inquiry makes the most sense when the patentee—either on its own or
through a licensee—is commercializing its invention. In that case, courts can
consider actual consumer evidence on substitution in the marketplace.226
Adding market substitution to the patent-infringement inquiry would cur-
tail the scope of a commercialized patent to just those subsets of the pat-
ented invention that the patentee sought to exploit. Perhaps that is a good
thing in light of patent law’s goal of encouraging technological and scientific
innovation. That is, one might argue that a patentee would truly be harmed
in the marketplace only in relation to consumer substitutes for those imple-
mentations of a patented invention that the patentee has introduced into the
marketplace, whether by herself or through a licensee. If the patentee
(through no fault of a third party227) does not exploit the full scope of her
223. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926–31 (2d Cir. 1994).
But cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994) (“If [a] use is other-
wise fair, then no permission need be sought or granted.”).
224. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest
and costs as fixed by the court.”).
225. Even under this broader approach, however, it is not clear that the IP owner should
have the right to control the market rather than just to receive compensation for uses. See Alex
Kozinski & Christopher M. Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. Copyright Soc’y
U.S.A. 513 (1999) (arguing that fair use should be replaced with a system of compulsory
licenses); Lemley, supra note 221.
226. Even then, a court might sometimes face difficult questions about who the consumer
actually is. One such context involves pharmaceuticals and medical devices: Is the consumer
the doctor who prescribes particular medication for a patient or buys a medical device to use
on a patient? Or is the consumer the patient who takes the drug or on whom the doctor
operates? Cf. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)
(assessing the patentability of methods for calibrating the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs to
treat autoimmune disorders).
227. Because a patent right provides a right to exclude others from using the patented
invention and because improvements on the invention might be patented, it is possible for
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invention, according to this reasoning, the patentee would be “penalized” by
limiting the scope of the invention to accused products that consumers
would consider substitutes.228
Patent law does not currently require that patented inventions be com-
mercialized.229 As a result, the law has seen the rise of nonpracticing entities
(or so-called patent trolls) holding patents but not themselves making prod-
ucts; in fact, such entities are now responsible for over 50 percent of all
patent suits.230 If we required commercialization as proof of market substitu-
tion, nonpracticing entities would bear the brunt of that penalty because
they neither practice the invention nor grant exclusive licenses to others to
do so. A true commercialization requirement would render their patents
worthless unless and until they entered the market themselves or found an
exclusive licensee.
Courts appropriately take account of the market relationship between
the inventor and the accused infringer in optimizing patent scope. But de-
priving all nonpracticing entities of the entire value of their technology
would go too far.231 One possibility in this situation is to imagine, from the
consumer’s vantage point, whether the defendant’s product would act as a
market substitute for a hypothetical product within the plaintiff’s patent
scope. That is, the question of market substitution in patent infringement is
whether the patented invention—commercialized or not—and the defen-
dant’s product would operate in the same market. While the issue might be
easier to analyze when there is an actual marketplace, we see no reason that
the issue cannot also be addressed hypothetically.232 If the infringer’s prod-
uct substitutes for the patentee’s idea, the patentee is entitled to compensa-
tion for that use whether or not the patentee itself makes a competing
product.
By contrast, a focus on market substitution in patent law should also
lead to a defense for those who use the patented invention in a new and
someone to hold a valid patent to an invention that the patentee has no right to use. See 35
U.S.C. § 154(a). For example, a patent holder for a rocking chair might not be able to make
and sell the invention if there is a valid patent on a normal chair because making the rocking
chair would also necessarily infringe the basic chair patent.
228. Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 Hastings L.J.
65 (2009) (arguing that patent plaintiffs should have to reduce their inventions to practice
before asserting their patent); Sichelman, supra note 51 (proposing that commercialization be
encouraged through commercialization patents).
229. See Sichelman, supra note 51, at 343.
230. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum.
L. Rev. 2117, 2119 n.13 (2013) (citing sources); cf. Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan &
David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) 4–5 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law
Program in Law, Behavior & Soc. Sci. Research Paper Series, Paper No. LBSS 14-20, 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346381 (finding that practic-
ing entities filed just under half of all patent suits in 2012).
231. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 230, at 2119 n.13 (arguing that trolls are not bad
per se but are a symptom of problems with the patent system).
232. Patent law embraces the hypothetical in employing the person having ordinary skill
in the art as a hypothetical construct. See supra text accompanying notes 66–73.
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unrelated context. Repurposing technology is an important part of the inno-
vative process and one that patent law currently does too little to en-
courage.233 American patent law has no fair-use defense,234 no real defense
for experimental use,235 and virtually no defense even for radical improv-
ers.236 In each of these cases, patent law has chosen to focus on technical
similarity, even when market substitution seems unlikely or when allowing
the defendant’s product is desirable for other reasons. Patent law should
encourage not just initial invention but follow-on improvement.237 Using the
consumer’s perspective to evaluate how the defendant’s product compares to
what the plaintiff invented, whether by restricting the definition of infringe-
ment or adopting a fair-use or transformative-use defense, can help en-
courage invention and improvement.
2. Mandating Similarity in Trademark Law
If patent law focuses too much on the expert, trademark law presents
the opposite problem. Because the audience is typically deemed to be con-
sumers, who tend to focus on market substitution, trademark law pays more
attention to market substitution than to technical similarity from the ex-
pert’s point of view. As such, trademark law finds a defendant’s mark in-
fringing if the similarity between the marks would confuse any minimally
significant number of consumers.238 If people think that a basketball game’s
start time is the result of a deal with a trademark owner, the trademark
owner gets the right to control that starting time.239
Trademark law does have some limitations that require at least a mini-
mum level of technical similarity. Trademark protection cannot extend to
generic terms because protecting those terms would impose heavy costs on
those competing in the relevant industry to describe their goods or ser-
vices.240 Even the presence of a generic term in a composite mark is not itself
233. See Strandburg, supra note 220 (discussing the importance of user innovation and its
implications for patent law).
234. See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
Colum. L. Rev. 1177 (2000) (arguing for the introduction of a fair-use defense in patent law);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 265 (2011) (advancing a
proposal for a fair-use defense in patent law).
235. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 81 (discussing the potential benefits of a well-
designed experimental-use defense).
236. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
237. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 839, 843–44 (1990); see also Lemley, supra note 10.
238. See supra Section I.A.
239. In fact, in at least one case there is a real relationship. See Mark P. McKenna, Trade-
mark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 773, 823 (discussing 7-Eleven’s
licensing deal with a baseball team to start its games at 7:11 p.m.).
240. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 23, at 793–94.
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protectable.241 For example, Apple is entitled to prevent other computer
companies from using the word “apple” but not from using the word “com-
puter”; and it cannot prevent fruit companies from using the term “apple.”
But because the fact finder examines the entire mark in his assessment and
because the law prohibits “dissection” of the mark into protectable and un-
protectable components,242 trademark law gives the fact finders the entirety
of these composite marks and asks them to assess likelihood of confusion.
The presence of the generic term may well influence a jury to find the defen-
dant’s mark—say, Pineapple Computer243—similar, even though it is not
supposed to consider the use of the generic term. The less obvious it is that a
term is generic, the more likely this problem is to occur. Thus, Nuthatch
Honey Brown Ale might be found to infringe Nutlee’s Honey Brown Ale,
even though the courts have held that the term “Honey Brown Ale” is
generic.244
A similar story can be told of functional marks and marks that third
parties use descriptively or for purposes of parody.245 Functional marks are
not to be protected under trademark law even if they have acquired meaning
as a brand signifier to consumers.246 The reason for this is similar to that for
denying protection to generic marks: it is too harmful to fair competition in
the industry to declare off limits a functional component of a good or ser-
vice.247 We are not entitled to own “round” as the shape of our tires, no
matter how much people associate that shape with our products, because
others need their tires to be round. And because of similar harms to com-
merce and free speech,248 trademark law does not consider as infringement
third parties’ use of otherwise valid trademarks to describe their own good
or service or to parody the trademark or its associated goods or services.249
In all of these instances, the exclusive reliance on consumer percep-
tion—and therefore primarily on market substitution—is a problem for
trademark law. It means that there is no logical limit to the scope of trade-
mark law: whatever consumers think the law is, the law should become.250 If
trademark law is to have any constant meaning, it must come from some
241. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012).
242. 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, supra note 31, § 7:36.
243. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (enjoining
use of “Pineapple” as a mark for computers).
244. Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 203–207.
246. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28–29 (2001).
247. Jay Franco & Sons v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 2010).
248. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Prop-
erty and Free Speech, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 41–54 (2013).
249. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 103–04 (2d Cir.
2001).
250. For criticism of this fact, see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1691, and Lemley &
McKenna, supra note 211.
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limits, either on what trademark law will protect or on the degree of similar-
ity required for a finding of infringement. Those limits can’t easily take the
form of rules because there is no magic “80 percent similarity” threshold for
mark sameness. But trademark law should consider technical similarity from
the expert’s vantage point beyond simply throwing it into the overall ques-
tion of whether consumers are likely to be confused. This consideration
would allow branding and industry experts to offer relevant evidence on the
genericness, functionality, descriptiveness, or parodic aspects of the trade-
mark and the defendant’s use.
Finally, the audience in trademark law is connected to the dispute over
the extent to which trademark courts should set standards for consumer
behavior rather than merely follow what consumers already think.251 A
purely fact-finding role for trademark law based on consumer viewpoints is
ultimately circular: conduct is illegal if consumers think it is illegal. The
(il)logical extreme of this approach is to ask the public what they think the
law is (or ought to be) and make the law conform to whatever they say.252
Because trademark law focuses on the least sophisticated 10 percent of con-
sumers,253 the result may be not just a circle but a spiral, in which the more
we coddle consumers, the less able they are to distinguish different goods
and services.254 That in turn would make broader swaths of competition
unlawful, to the detriment of the very ends trademark law is supposed to
serve. As Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley explain,
We can demonstrate this point with a seemingly extreme example. Most
everyone would presumably agree that a grocery store should be allowed to
locate generic colas on a shelf next to Coca-Cola. But why? One would say,
perhaps, that such uses do not confuse consumers into thinking that Coke
licenses the placement or sponsors the generic colas. But if consumers are
not confused about sponsorship, it is only because the law has long permit-
ted such uses, and so consumers accept and understand them. That is not
an inevitable result, however. Had the courts said at the outset that trade-
mark owners could sue to prevent such placement—reasoning that con-
sumers might think that proximity implied association and diverted sales,
as evidenced by the fact that product sellers pay grocery store owners for
shelf placement—one can easily imagine a world in which grocery stores
had to separate like products to avoid any risk of association. Further, even
251. Compare Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1671–73 (noting that focusing on con-
sumer confusion to the exclusion of trademark use has led to the expansion of trademark
protections), with Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism
in Trademark Law, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1597, 1602 (2007) (arguing against adopting the trade-
mark-use theory because it would prevent trademark law from policing new markets).
252. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772–78 (8th Cir. 1994)
(finding infringement based on evidence that while only 6 percent of consumers were actually
confused by the defendant’s ad, nearly half of those surveyed thought that the defendant
should have to get permission from the plaintiff to run the ad).
253. See supra text accompanying note 37.
254. Cf. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
Yale L.J. 882, 908–12 (2007) (describing how courts expand trademark protections based on
consumer perceptions of trademark norms).
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if a finding of confusion seemed unlikely, many companies would agree to
change their behavior or take a license rather than pay to litigate a case all
the way to trial and risk losing. This, in turn, would mean that consumers
would not be used to seeing all the colas grouped together and would make
it harder for anyone else to make such a use because, over time, the place-
ment of generic cola beside Coke would be more surprising to consumers.
And if no one else is putting generic colas next to Coke, it is an easy mental
step to conclude that a grocer that does so is free riding on Coke’s interest
in being insulated from nearby competitors, particularly if the grocer is
making money directly or indirectly from the placement or sales of generic
colas.255
It seems reasonable to draw a line at some point and say that the law will
simply refuse to countenance some theories of consumer confusion. Perhaps
that line should be drawn at nontrademark uses.256 Perhaps it should be
drawn at uses that cause no injury to the trademark owner.257 But regardless
of where we draw the line, there is surely some point at which the law ought
to deny trademark owners relief, even if they could adduce evidence of 10
percent confusion or evidence of a defendant’s intent to “free ride” on an
existing mark.258 Too much emphasis on consumer confusion may under-
mine rather than promote competition in the marketplace, which is trade-
mark law’s basic goal.259 And an exclusive focus on the consumer perspective
may de-emphasize the normative function the fact finder should serve in
trademark law.
3. Copyright’s Hybrid
Unlike trademark and patent law, copyright does assess infringement
using a hybrid of technical similarity and market substitution from the van-
tage point of both the consumer and the expert. The Ninth Circuit in partic-
ular recognizes that two vantage points ought to be used: the expert and the
ordinary reasonable observer.260 While we would use the consumer instead
of the ordinary reasonable observer for the reasons described above,261 and
while we have some problems with the way it applies the test, the Ninth
Circuit is correct to recognize that given copyright law’s underlying goals,
multiple vantage points matter. In any event, copyright is at least trying to
ask both of the relevant questions: How similar is the defendant’s product to
the plaintiff’s creative contribution, and what is the marketplace impact of
that similarity? In doing so, copyright provides room for transformative
reuses of a work in productive contexts as well as encourages differentiated
255. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1694–95.
256. Id.
257. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 211.
258. For explanations of the ultimately empty nature of the anti-free-riding impulse, see
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1694, and Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 138–42.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 20–25.
260. See supra Section I.C.
261. See supra note 218.
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competitive products that constrain the copyright owner’s market power.262
That doesn’t mean copyright is a perfect model; indeed, we suggest above
that copyright courts should take various approaches to integrating this evi-
dence.263 But copyright law is at least asking many of the right questions.264
Substantial-similarity analysis is not the only place in copyright where
both expert and consumer views would be beneficial. Fair use, copyright
law’s major defense against infringement, would also benefit from an ex-
plicit appreciation of both consumer and expert views. The doctrine of fair
use excuses infringement on an equitable basis, looking to such factors as
“the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” “the nature of
the copyrighted work,” “the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” and “the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”265 While
the line between infringement and fair use is murky,266 certain categories of
works tend to be favored as fair: parodies or other uses that transform the
original work into one with a new meaning, uses of copyrighted works in
news reporting or historical research, and uses in comparative advertising, to
262. On the economics of product differentiation, see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and
Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212 (2004).
263. One of us has argued that most copyright cases get this process backwards, empha-
sizing technical similarity when they should focus on market equivalence and emphasizing
market substitution when it is technical similarity that matters. Lemley, supra note 99. But see
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 Duke L.J. 203
(2012) (“[S]ubstantial similarity remains an unappreciated source of flexibility and pluralism
in copyright law.”).
Irina Manta has argued that copyright should turn to survey evidence to determine what
consumers really think. Manta, supra note 159. Although surveys in the context of copyright
law raise a number of unique concerns (such as the feasibility of surveying consumers about
lengthy works, such as multihour movies or books containing hundreds of pages) in addition
to more general worries of bias in surveys, with appropriate constraints surveys might some-
times help improve the decisionmaking process.
264. This analysis applies more directly to infringement cases assessing copyright law’s
exclusive right of reproduction, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012), than the right “to prepare deriva-
tive works based upon the copyrighted work.” Id. § 106(2). The former, as understood by the
courts, assesses substantial similarity as we describe above. See supra Section I.C. The latter
right seems directly to contemplate that copyright holders can have rights in works that are
not market substitutes with those they have already created but that extend into related, deriv-
ative markets, such as a novel and a stuffed animal portraying a character in the novel. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (defining “derivative work”). Our analysis provides even more reason for evaluat-
ing the adaptation right in derivative works separately from the reproduction right, as some
scholars suggest. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 209, 230 (1983); Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Concep-
tion of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right, 101 Geo. L.J. 1505, 1534 (2013).
265. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577
(1994).
266. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L.
Rev. 1483 (2007).
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name a few.267 The four traditional fair-use factors often point in favor of
these works in these classes of cases, principally because they do not com-
pete in the market with the copyrighted work and because they are valuable
in promoting the progress of culture and knowledge.268 These two reasons
are precisely those that draw from the consumer and expert vantage points,
respectively, in copyright law. Copyright’s hybrid audience, then, is inti-
mately related not only to its infringement analysis but also to the fair-use
doctrine.
4. A Missed Opportunity: Design Patents
Design patent infringement traditionally required evidence of both
technical similarity and market substitution.269 Unfortunately, recent
changes in the law have all but abandoned design patent’s traditional reli-
ance on technological substitution.270 Unlike utility patents covering inven-
tions, which are defined by the language of written claims, design patents
covering new ornamental features of an object are defined in substantial part
by a drawing of the patentee’s design.271 The basic test for infringement of a
design patent is the ordinary observer test, which assesses “whether an ordi-
nary observer, familiar with the prior art, would be deceived into thinking
that the accused design was the same as the patented design.”272 That test
had long been supplemented by a requirement that the defendant have ap-
propriated the invention’s point of novelty. If the defendant’s use didn’t in-
clude the novel feature(s) in the patentee’s design, it couldn’t infringe.
In 2008, however, in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,273 the Federal
Circuit changed the law of design patents to eliminate the point-of-novelty
test for infringement. The court worried that a focus on the point of novelty
would confuse fact finders, particularly in the subset of cases in which the
patentee’s invention was a combination of existing features rather than the
development of a new one.274 The focus, as with utility patents, must be on
the overall appearance of the whole design, not on “small” differences at the
point of novelty.275 Novelty still matters but now only as a defense that must
267. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537, 2544–46
(2009).
268. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576–94 (parodies); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608–15 (2d Cir. 2006) (historical research); Sony Computer
Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1025–30 (9th Cir. 2000) (comparative
advertising).
269. See supra Section I.D.
270. See supra Section I.D.
271. See Design Patent Application Guide, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., www.uspto.gov/
patents/resources/types/designapp.jsp (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
272. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
273. Id. at 678.
274. Id. at 676–78.
275. Id. at 677–78.
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generally be assessed separately from infringement.276 And the doctrine of
functionality, which in theory should prevent design patents from hindering
market competition based on the operation of the product rather than on its
function, has been interpreted so narrowly as to be virtually meaningless.277
The move away from the novelty of the design patent to exclusive reli-
ance on the ordinary-observer test is a move away from a hybrid scheme to
an exclusive reliance on market substitution. Design patent law used to re-
quire both a minimum level of technical similarity and a similarity in con-
sumer appeal; now it requires only the latter. We think this is a mistake278
because it allows evidence of market substitution alone to prove infringe-
ment, regardless of whether the defendant copied the novel features of the
plaintiff’s patent at all. The justification for granting a design patent is not
the patentee’s desire to own a market but the supposed novelty of the de-
sign. Ignoring technical similarity from the expert’s vantage point divorces
the assessment of infringement from the justification for having the design
patent in the first place. We think design patent should properly be con-
cerned only with a combination of technical similarity and market
substitution.
***
Understanding the different ways in which IP regimes approach the au-
dience question should cause us to reevaluate our general theory of IP in-
fringement. When we do, we find that both the consumer and expert
approaches have something to teach us. None of the IP regimes has a mo-
nopoly on wisdom when it comes to infringement. Integrating the perspec-
tives of the expert and the consumer allows us to refocus infringement
analysis. We should not choose technical similarity over market substitution
276. Id. at 678–79.
277. See Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17
Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2013) (discussing the limited use of functionality in design patent law);
J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and New Technologies: The United States Experience in a
Transnational Perspective, 19 U. Balt. L. Rev. 6, 40 (1989); Michael Risch, Functionality and
Graphical User Interface Design Patents, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 53 (2013) (discussing the
cramped reading of obviousness in design patents).
278. One of the authors has criticized the rule as follows:
Think about this for a minute. It is no longer the law that the defendant must incorpo-
rate the very thing that makes the patented invention patentable. As long as an ordinary
observer would confuse the two products, the fact that that confusion arises from simi-
larities that already exist in the prior art doesn’t defeat a finding of infringement. It might
or might not create a defense that the patent is invalid for anticipation, though again that
seems to depend on what an ordinary observer would think when comparing the pat-
ented design and the prior art. Translated for a moment into terms of utility patents, it is
as though we granted a patent on a car having an intermittent windshield wiper as the
novel feature and then allowed the patentee to sue a car maker that didn’t include that
feature because the cars otherwise had the same elements. That can’t possibly be the right
rule.
Lemley, supra note 138, at 1271 (footnote omitted).
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or vice versa; infringement should properly require both. Because it does in
fact require both, deciding an IP infringement case necessitates both expert
and consumer perspectives. This dual focus can both explain significant
doctrines in current law, like fair use in copyright, and point the way to new
rules in patent and trademark law that confront the very real problems in
those areas.
There is much to be done to turn this conceptual vision of IP infringe-
ment into reality. More work will be required to think through the ramifica-
tions of our dual approach for various IP doctrines. We have identified a few
major changes, but there will doubtless be others. And there may be reasons
to depart from the general model in particular circumstances. There are also
practical concerns with implementation. Because there are two relevant
audiences in IP infringement cases, fact finders need to do two jobs: model
the expert and model the consumer. As outlined above, there are a number
of complications in figuring out how best to assess each of these views in IP
infringement cases.279 Even beyond these issues, there is the problem of how
to channel each of these audiences without confusing the fact finder or caus-
ing the fact finder to defer to one viewpoint at the expense of the other.280
Courts will either have to bifurcate the technical and market inquiries
among different fact finders or engage in a complex channeling inquiry.
Those are similar to problems courts have addressed before, and we are con-
fident they are manageable issues.281 But courts will have to work to find the
right balance in the new hybrid system.
Conclusion
IP regimes have traditionally offered no coherent answer to the ques-
tion, “From whose perspective should we judge infringement?” That inco-
herence reflects divergent views over whether IP should care about technical
similarity or market substitution, and hence whether it is the expert, the
ordinary observer, or the consumer who is the proper audience in IP in-
fringement. We are the first to identify this distinction and show that the
different approaches IP regimes take to proving infringement are traceable
to the different conceptions of the proper audience in each regime.
As a normative matter, we argue that IP infringement—across trade-
mark, patent, copyright, and design patent laws—should generally require
279. See supra Part I.
280. An example of undue influence involves a copyright infringement lawsuit against the
Bee Gees’ recording of the song, “How Deep Is Your Love?” Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th
Cir. 1984). After the jury rendered a verdict of infringement against the Bee Gees, the jury
foreman told the press that a major factor in the jury’s finding was that the plaintiff’s expert
said the Bee Gees did not independently create their song, and the Bee Gees offered no expert
testimony to rebut that suggestion. Maurice Possley, Bee Gees Found Guilty of Plagiarism,
Rolling Stone, Apr. 14, 1983, at 60, 60.
281. Cf., e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190–195 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (discussing the benefits of bifurcating proceedings in capital cases into
guilt and punishment phases).
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proof both that the two works are sufficiently similar in their novel aspects
(technical similarity) and that the defendant’s use interferes with the plain-
tiff’s market (market substitution). Many of the problems in IP law come
from decisions that neglect one aspect or the other. Thus, “the audience” in
IP infringement is properly a hybrid: a domain expert who can assess simi-
larity and a consumer who can assess substitutability. Copyright law has
internalized this lesson, albeit imperfectly. Patent, trademark, and design
patent laws can all learn from its example.
